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The Latvian economy made great strides in recovering from the economic shock of the 
early transition and the adverse after-effects of the 1998 Russian financial crisis.   
Nevertheless, Latvia faces serious challenges to its future growth and prosperity despite 
these impressive achievements and the outward appearance of macroeconomic stability 
and economic progress.  
 
However, a wide variety of recent studies suggest that the Latvian economy is not 
particularly competitive and, even more worrisome, they indicate that Latvia is not well 
positioned to gain ground in the race for global competitiveness, prosperity, and rising 
standards of living.  Most of Latvia’s growth to date has come from one-off gains 
generated by structural reforms, privatization, and reallocating resources, not 
inexhaustible reservoirs of growth. Latvian enterprises will be able to sustain economic 
growth and create high wage jobs only by becoming internationally competitive, 
innovating, accumulating new knowledge and technology, and finding a high value added 
niche in the European and global division of labor.      
 
This paper is designed to help Latvian leaders (i) develop and clear diagnosis of the 
innovation and competitiveness challenges facing Latvia as it prepares to enter the EU 
and, more importantly (ii) design and implement policies and programs to ensure that 
Latvia reaps the maximum possible benefits from EU structural funds.  Section II 
analyzes the current structure of Latvia’s production, imports, and exports.  Section III 
utilizes data from a number of competitiveness reports to benchmark Latvia’s current 
progress against a number of comparator countries and to pinpoint Latvia’s strengths and 
weaknesses as an innovative economy.  Section IV offers a detailed list of potential 
policies and programs that could improve the competitiveness of Latvian enterprises and 
the efficiency of the Latvian NIS.  The recommendations include specific policies and 
programs to improve (i) the production of knowledge in Latvia, (ii) the 
commercialization of technology produced by Latvian scientists, small companies, and 
research institutes, and perhaps most importantly, (iii) local firms’ capacity to absorb, 
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The Latvian economy made great strides in recovering from the economic shock of the 
early transition and the adverse after-effects of the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  GDP 
growth has been robust, averaging close to 6% p.a. over the past five years.  Inflation is 
low.  The currency is stable.  Internal and external deficits are at sustainable levels.  
Annual FDI inflows and gross fixed capital formation, which grew at a 19% annual rate 
between 1996 and 2001,
1are both at relatively healthy levels.  Standards of living and 
consumption are both growing at a steady pace.  And perhaps most importantly, Latvia 
became a member of the European Union on May 1, 2004.  Nevertheless, Latvia faces 
serious challenges to its future growth and prosperity despite these impressive 
achievements and the outward appearance of macroeconomic stability and economic 
progress.  
 
Most of Latvia’s growth to date has come from pent up consumer demand and efficiency 
gains generated by structural reforms, privatization, and reallocating resources from loss 
making enterprises to more profitable enterprises.  Unfortunately, these are one-off gains, 
not inexhaustible reservoirs of growth.  Latvian enterprises will be able to sustain 
economic growth and create high wage jobs only by becoming internationally 
competitive, innovating, accumulating new knowledge and technology, and finding a 
high value added niche in the European and global division of labor.      
 
Looked at from this vantage point, the picture is not so rosy.  Simply and starkly stated, a 
wide variety of recent studies suggest that the Latvian economy is not particularly 
competitive and, even more worrisome, they indicate that Latvia is not well positioned to 
gain ground in the race for global competitiveness, prosperity, and rising standards of 
living.  All this bodes poorly for Latvia’s future competitiveness and prosperity unless 
leaders of Latvia’s business, government, university, and scientific communities develop 
and implement clear, concrete policies to address these challenges.  
 
Successive Latvian governments have formally approved and adopted a number of policy 
papers including a National Concept on R&D (1998), a National Concept on Innovation 
(2001), the National Innovation Program (2003) and the Draft Programme Complement 
of the Single Programming Document for Latvia 2004-2006 (2003).
2  These documents 
clearly describe some of the most critical weaknesses and pressing challenges that Latvia 
                                                 
1   Latvia Innovation survey, chapter 3, page 17. 
 
2   Priority 2 of the Single Programming Document is devoted to “Promotion of Enterprise and 
Innovation” and lists such objectives as creating new enterprises and increasing competitiveness of 
existing enterprises via transition to knowledge-intensive production and designing, producing and 
marketing internationally competitive products and services. 
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must overcome if it wishes to develop a National Innovation System (NIS)
3 that can be 
an instrument for creating wealth, raising standards of living, and increasing global 
competitiveness.   
 
These documents acknowledge the importance of upgrading the technological base and 
global competitiveness of traditional Latvian industrial sectors.
4 But the 
recommendations emphasize (i) the production and commercialization of domestic R&D 
and (ii) the development of new high tech industries.  They tend to downplay or ignore 
policies and programs that would (i) help to upgrade the technological capability and 
productivity of those traditional economic sectors that account for the largest share of 
Latvian employment and exports and (ii) help Latvia develop an efficient system to 
absorb and diffuse knowledge produced elsewhere.   
 
This is not surprising.  Latvia is struggling with two related challenges.  The first is 
reforming the NIS so that it becomes a tool for converting the country’s considerable 
scientific capacity and human capital into an asset for economic growth, competitiveness, 
and rising standards of living.  The second is enhancing competitiveness and productivity 
in non-high tech sectors.  In confronting these twin challenges, Latvian policy makers 
need to address several policy dilemmas.  Specifically:  
 
•  Dilemma #1:  Basic Research vs. Innovation and Technology Upgrading.  
Basic research and innovation are not synonymous concepts, especially in 
countries like Latvia where most enterprises operate far below the technological 
frontier.  As we will show in more detail below, very few Latvian enterprises 
innovate and most of these firms innovate by importing capital equipment rather 
than by either conducting basic research themselves or purchasing research 
services from Latvian or foreign research institutes.  For better or worse, in other 
words, innovation and basic research in Latvia are separate, distinct, and discrete 
activities.  Policy makers may be missing an important opportunity to increase 
employment, wages, and overall standards of living if they focus on basic 
research to the exclusion of the more “mundane” tasks of technology upgrading -- 
design and engineering, the ability to acquire technology developed outside the 
country, and the managerial, organizational and technical capacity simply to 
                                                 
3   The NIS can be defined as the way in which the private sector, universities, R&D institutes, and 
government policies interact to generate inventions and innovations that can be converted into new 
products or production processes that enhance the competitive advantage of firms in that country. 
 
4   For example, Chapter 1 of the National Innovation Program for 2003-2006 states, “Restructuring of the 
Latvian economy must be carried by stimulating the transformation of the traditional economic sectors 
on a productive technical and technological basis as well as creating for the first time in Latvia new 
branches based upon new knowledge and up-to-date technologies.”  Similarly, the Innovation Survey 
(Chapter 3, page 18, declares, “GDP growth can be ensured only by increasing the value added of the 
manufactured goods and services. This can be achieved by increasing the material input and labor 
capital involved in the production process.  Due to the limited possibilities to increase input the main 
way how to ensure GDP growth is to boost the amount of the intellectual capital in business.” 
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utilize more advanced technology – in those core industries which operate far 
below the technology frontier.
5   
 
•  Dilemma #2:  High Tech Sectors Vs. High Value Added.  Contrary to popular 
opinion, high tech is not always synonymous with high value added, high wages 
and rapid growth.  On the contrary, transition economies such as Latvia may get 
more development “bang for the buck” by helping such “low tech” sectors as 
forestry and food processing increase value added than by trying to develop a few 
high tech niche products and industries.  Policy makers, however, tend to view 
high tech as the surest route to competitiveness and prosperity.  They mistakenly 
devote considerable resources to building up a small high tech sector while 
ignoring the competitive enhancing opportunities available from the much larger 
non-high tech part of the economy.
6  At a minimum, some balance needs to be 
restored to the high tech/non-high tech equation.  An imbalance could be 
especially damaging to long run growth and economic stability if government 
support of high-tech sectors creates a dual economy: on the one hand a low wage, 
low productivity traditional sector responsible for the bulk of employment, GDP 
and exports and, on the other hand, a small high-tech sector that is more or less 
disconnected from the rest of the economy.   
 
•  Dilemma #3:  Production and Sale of Knowledge Produced Inside Latvia vs. 
the Import, Absorption, and Diffusion of Knowledge Produced Outside 
Latvia.  Policy makers should not focus solely on the commercialization of 
knowledge produced inside Latvia at the expense of helping firms import 
innovative technology produced outside Latvia and adapting it for local use.  This 
issue is especially critical for Latvia.  Total annual R&D spending in Latvia from 
all public, private and foreign sources is about equal to one week’s R&D 
spending by one large US corporation.  And the total number of R&D personnel 
in Latvia is equivalent to the total R&D personnel in one mid-sized US 
laboratory.  Thus, even if Latvia boosts R&D spending (as a share of GDP) to the 
EU average, vastly improves the targeting and efficiency of its R&D spending, 
and commercializes a large share of those technological innovations generated in 
Latvian laboratories, Latvia will still be a minor player in the global R&D arena.  
Like it or not, therefore, most of the economically relevant knowledge that 
Latvian firms will need to boost productivity and compete internationally will be 
produced is produced elsewhere.  Latvia’s success in the global economy will 
depend as much on the ability and willingness of Latvian enterprises (both 
foreign-owned and domestic) to adapt and utilize knowledge produced outside 
                                                 
5   It is also important to note that adopting, adapting, and applying the results of basic research requires 
advanced managerial and organizational capacities.  When firms do not have these capacities, it will be 
futile for governments to finance large amounts of basic research in the hope that this will generate 
increased levels of innovation and enterprise productivity. 
6    For example, computers are generally regarded as high-tech activities.  However, assembling 
computers is not a high wage, high tech activity, even though computers are classified as a high tech 
export in international trade statistics.  Similarly, forestry sector exports are classified as a low tech 
export, although  as we will show in more detail below, forestry activities can be either high tech or 
low tech depending on how much skill, knowledge, and research is applied.   8
Latvia as it will be for Latvian scientists to commercialize the knowledge 
produced inside Latvia.  Latvian policy makers and business executives, 
therefore, need to devote more attention to enhancing Latvia’s ability to scour the 
world for knowledge, import it into Latvia, adapt it for local use, and integrate it 
into local production processes. 
 
•  Dilemma #4:  SMEs vs. Large Enterprises.  Policy recommendations to 
improve the functioning of the R&D and innovation systems typically focus on 
the promotion of high tech SMEs.  This is prompted by a desire to replicate the 
success of Silicon Valley.  But it is also based on a misunderstanding of the 
Silicon Valley phenomenon.  True, Silicon Valley is a hotbed of small, high tech 
startups. But these SMEs did not arise in a vacuum or in isolation from large 
dynamic enterprises.  On the contrary, SMEs which operate without a dense 
network of linkages to dynamic larger (foreign or domestic) enterprises will most 
likely not become a source of well paying jobs, economic competitiveness and 
rapid growth.  Instead, they are likely to become little more than low productivity, 
subsistence operations.  Put differently, links to dynamic large enterprises may be 
a critical pre-requisite for the emergence of dynamic SMEs.  If so, policy makers 
may be making a serious blunder if their SME policies do not pay sufficient 
attention to helping large Latvian enterprises become more dynamic and 
competitive and helping Latvian SMEs become qualified suppliers to dynamic 
Latvian, EU, or international large enterprises.  Developing these supplier 
relationships through well targeted training policies, supplier development 
programs, and entrepreneurship education, should become a more prominent 
feature of Latvia’s SME policy, innovation policy, and competitiveness strategy.  
 
•  Dilemma #5:  Innovation Vs. Everything Else.  Innovation policy covers many 
issues that at first glance would appear to have little to do with innovation.  For 
example, one influential analysis of factors that influence the “national 
environment for innovation”
7 refers to such items as “sophisticated and 
demanding local customers,” “home customer needs that anticipate those 
elsewhere,” the “presence of capable local suppliers and related companies,” 
“vigorous competition among locally based rivals,” and the “presence of clusters 
instead of isolated industries.”  These business environmental factors help to 
establish a strong demand for innovation.  They give local enterprises the 
incentive to innovate, the knowledge about what innovation could be most 
profitable, the capacity to assess technology options.  In this respect, they are a 
critical complement to local R&D capacity.  Unfortunately, Latvia and many 
other transition economies rank rather well on indices of scientists and engineers 
and perform rather poorly on indices of clusters and linkages.  Their major 
weakness, in other words, is their relative inability to utilize knowledge and 
human capital effectively and efficiently.  This suggests that policy makers will 
                                                 
7    Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern, “National Innovation Capacity,” Chapter 2.2 in Porter, Sachs, 
Cornelius, McArthur and Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
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maximize the effectiveness of education, training, and R&D initiatives if they 
embed them in a broader policy of competitiveness, linkages, cluster formation, 
and entrepreneurship. 
 
•  Dilemma #6: Scientists vs. Entrepreneurs.  It is generally accepted that 
entrepreneurs cannot use their entrepreneurial skills to become good scientists.  
But the converse is also true.  Most good scientists cannot use their scientific 
skills to become good entrepreneurs.  Unfortunately, this truism is often 
overlooked when policy makers attempt to promote technology 
commercialization.  Policy makers establish incubators and technoparks to nurture 
new businesses started and operated by scientist-entrepreneurs.  These 
commercialization institutions frequently fail to live up to their founders’ 
expectations, in part because they tacitly assume that top notch scientists can 
handle the marketing, sales, financial, legal and overall managerial tasks 
performed by a top notch entrepreneurs.  This is rarely the case.  Therefore, if 
policy makers want to promote technology commercialization, they will need to 
establish linkages between top notch scientists on the one hand and top notch 
entrepreneurs on the other hand.    
 
•  Dilemma 7:  Numerical R&D Targets Vs. Structural Reforms.  The Lisbon 
Strategy calls on EU members to increase average R&D expenditures to 3% of 
GDP by 2010.  Achieving this numerical target would entail a seven-fold increase 
in Latvia’s annual R&D expenditures, which currently amount to 0.48% of GDP.  
An increase of this magnitude over the next six to seven years is clearly 
unfeasible and, more importantly, without significant reforms in the structure of 
R&D spending, would be tantamount to throwing good money after bad.   
Countries with higher per capita GDP do indeed spend more on R&D (relative to 
GDP) and there is no doubt that increased R&D spending contributes to higher 
per capita GDP.
8  But it would be wrong to assume that there is a straight-
forward, mechanistic relationship between increased R&D spending and higher 
per capita GDP.  Simply increasing R&D spending will not lead to higher per 
capita GDP.  On the contrary, as per capita incomes increased in Korea, Ireland 
and Finland, both the volume and composition of R&D changed significantly. For 
example, the source of R&D financing shifted gradually from the public to the 
private sector.  Perhaps even more importantly, the performance of R&D shifted 
from public research laboratories to private enterprises.  In other words, increased 
R&D spending and increased per capita GDP went hand in hand with a increased 
                                                 
8   For an excellent summary of the relationship between economic development and R&D see, Daniel 
Lederman and William F. Maloney, R&D and Development, World Bank processed, 2003, available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/1daa46103229123885256831005ce0eb/8f9143d0d
a59975585256cb500771d24/$FILE/_e9him8pbidlgms82dc5m6urj5f4g549i440j20h35epimorrgdlimst1
l_.pdf .  See also, Lederman and Maloney, Innovation in Mexico: NAFTA Is Not Enough, World Bank 
processed, January 2003, available at  
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/1daa46103229123885256831005ce0eb/0a2b1dd6
8038bc5d85256cb000792297/$FILE/Lederman%20Maloney%20Innovation%20in%20Mexico.pdf .  
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private sector R&D.
9  And this in turn entailed a parallel increase in the 
sophistication of private sector enterprises so that they had the capacity and 
interest in financing and conducting R&D.  All this is currently missing in Latvia.  
Therefore, merely increasing the volume of R&D spending will do little to 
remedy Latvia’s problems unless this increase is preceded by significant 
institutional reforms.  
 
Fortunately, while the challenges and dilemmas facing Latvian policy makers are 
daunting, the situation is far from hopeless.  On the contrary, with hard work, good 
policies, political consensus, and an intelligent use of EU structural funds, Latvia can be 
well on its way to a bright, successful future.  EU structural funds could be especially 
important in this process.  Latvia will soon have an opportunity to benefit from large 
inflows of EU grant funds.  But this is only an opportunity which can be either 
squandered or exploited. It is generally recognized that some previous EU entrants 
squandered this opportunity and others used it to create the foundation for a dynamic, 
competitive economy.  The lesson for Latvian policy makers, therefore, is rather straight-
forward: If utilized productively and wisely, EU structural funds can provide Latvia with 
an opportunity to design and finance comprehensive programs, based on international 
lessons of experience and best practice, to improve the competitiveness of Latvian 
enterprises, make Latvia a more innovative economy, create a large and growing pool of 
high wage employment opportunities, and ensure that Latvia’s NIS efficiently and 
effectively converts knowledge into wealth.   
 
This paper is designed to help Latvian leaders (i) develop and clear diagnosis of the 
innovation and competitiveness challenges facing Latvia as it prepares to enter the EU 
and, more importantly (ii) design and implement policies and programs to ensure that 
Latvia reaps the maximum possible benefits from EU structural funds.  Section II 
analyzes the current structure of Latvia’s production, imports, and exports.  This analysis 
will show that Latvia is currently producing and exporting primarily low value added 
goods and services and importing high value added, knowledge-intensive goods and 
services.  Latvia, in other words, is running both a merchandise trade deficit and a 
knowledge deficit.  There is nothing wrong with obtaining knowledge embedded in 
imported goods and services.  Indeed, all successful economies must import knowledge.  
But many Latvian enterprises have no clear policy for, or capacity to, implement a policy 
of industrial upgrading – i.e., a strategy for shifting from the production of low value 
added goods and services to the production of higher value added goods and services.  
Unless this problem is resolved, Latvia’s current knowledge deficit will be a recipe for 
declining terms of trade, declining standards of living, and long term economic 
stagnation.   
                                                 
9    Official statistics suggest that the share of R&D financed by the Latvian private sector is 40%.  While 
this is below the OECD and EU average of close to 67%, it would appear to be a rather respectable 
level, especially given Latvia’s relatively low per capita GDP.  However, most of the private R&D in 
Latvia is performed by a few foreign telecom firms.  All other Latvian firms combined finance a 
relatively small share of total R&D.  Thus, the task for Latvia is much greater than the official statistics 
would suggest.  This issue is explored in greater detail below.  For additional data on the share of R&D 
financed by the private sector in various OECD and non-OECD countries, see OECD, Science, 
Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 2003, especially Section A.4.1 and A12.1.   11
 
Section III utilizes data from a number of competitiveness reports to benchmark Latvia’s 
current progress against a number of comparator countries and to pinpoint Latvia’s 
strengths and weaknesses as an innovative economy.  The analysis will suggest that 
Latvia is currently behind many EU New Member States (NMS’s) on many critical 
measures of innovative capacity.  If Latvia is going to compete and prosper within the EU 
as well as in the broader global economy, remedying these weaknesses in the NIS must 
become an urgent priority.   
 
Finally, Section IV offers a detailed list of policies and programs to improve the 
competitiveness of Latvian enterprises and the efficiency of the Latvian NIS.  In 
particular, this section will highlight programs to improve (i) the production of 
knowledge generated by the Latvian R&D system; (ii) the commercialization of the 
knowledge produced by the Latvian R&D system; and (iii) the absorption and diffusion 
of knowledge produced outside Latvia and the ability of Latvian enterprises to integrate 
this knowledge into their production processes.  The recommendations in this section are 
consistent with the broad policies and objectives which successive Latvian governments 
approved and endorsed in such documents as the National Concept on R&D (1998), the 
National Concept on Innovation (2001), the National Innovation Program (2003) and 
Priority 2 (Promotion of Enterprise and Innovation) of the Draft Programme Complement 
of the Single Programming Document for Latvia 2004-2006  (2003).  Our primary 
contribution, therefore, is to help policy makers convert their broad policy objectives into 
concrete, specific programs that can produce tangible economic results in five years. 
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II.  Latvia’s Industrial Structure     
 
During the Soviet period, Latvia was one of the USSR’s major high tech production 
centers – along with Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.  But despite its abundance of 
human capital and legacy of science-intensive production, Latvia’s principal attraction 
today for foreign investors and its principal comparative advantage is its supply of low 
wage labor performing relatively unskilled tasks while working in comparatively low 
productivity, low technology enterprises.   
 




•  As of 2002, labor productivity in Latvia was approximately one-third of the EU 
average.  Even more worrisome, Latvian labor productivity lags behind all NMS’s 
except Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
Figure 1 Labor productivity per employed person in 2002 
















GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS) per employed person, as % of EU-15 average
 
Source: Eurostat, 2003 
 
•  As of 2001, three industry groups -- wood and wood products, transport 
equipment, and textiles -- accounted for 70% of Latvia’s manufacturing exports.     13
Figure 2 Structure of Latvia’s Manufacturing Exports in 2001, as % of Total   





















Source: Ministry of Economy of Latvia, 2002. 
 
 
•  Between 1993 and 1999, productivity in these three sectors increased more slowly 
than overall manufacturing productivity.  In other words, Latvian exports are 
concentrated in sectors where productivity is growing at a relatively slow pace.  
This is not a recipe for long term prosperity or rising standards of living. 
 
Figure 3 Productivity gains in selected manufacturing sectors compared to  
average manufacturing productivity growth in Latvia, 1993-1999 






Food and food products
Wood and wood products
Paper, printing and publishing
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Rubber and plastic products
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B. Technology  Vs.  Labor  Intensive Industries 
 
•  The share of labor-intensive industries in Latvia is larger than the share of 
technology-driven industries (See Annex 1 for a definition of industrial 
taxonomies.) This is the reverse of the situation in current EU member states 
as well as in the most dynamic transition economies (Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Estonia).
10 
 












Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak
Rep.
Slovenia
Technology-Driven Industries Labor-Intensive Industries
 
   Source: WIIW, 2001 
 
•  A recent FIAS analysis
11 suggests that only 2% of the Latvian workforce is 
employed in high tech sectors, a figure that is far lower than the EU average in 
general and below the level in the NMS’s in particular.  Similarly, the Latvian 
Innovation Survey
12 reports that high tech sectors generate only 3%-4% of 
manufacturing output and 6% of exports, compared with 20%-30% in 
developing countries.
13   
                                                 
10  Unfortunately, sectoral data at the level of detail required to determine the technology and skill intensity 
of production and exports is available only until 1999.   
   
11   Paragraph 16 of draft FIAS report 
 
12   Chapter 3, P. 18 
 
13   Data about employment in high tech sectors and high tech exports needs to be interpreted with care.  
Until recently, for example, Mexico was the world’s largest high tech exporter.  But its exports 
consisted primarily of products assembled in Mexico with imported components.  Mexican value 
added was very low and Mexico’s contribution to these exports consisted primarily of low wage labor 
working in foreign-owned assembly plants.  Most of the high wage, high value added design, R&D, 
and marketing operations were conducted elsewhere.  As a result, productivity, wages and incomes in   15
•  Despite Latvia’s excellent stock of human capital, skilled workers and 
professionals do not seem to be involved in skill-intensive activities. As the 
chart below suggests, Latvia is weakest cc in terms of skilled workers engaged 
in either manufacturing or services.  
 



























Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce) in 2002 or the closest year
Employment in high-tech services in 2001 (% of total workforce)
 
Source: Eurostat, Trendchart 2003, available at  www.trendchart.org  
 
•    Exports produced by technology-driven industries account for a growing 
share of exports in nearly all NMS’s, with the highest shares (and largest 
increases) in Hungary (more than 47% of all manufacturing industry exports 
to the EU in 1999), Slovakia (30%), Estonia (24%) and the Czech Republic 
(21%) (Eurostat COMEXT Database).  By comparison, technology-driven 
industries account for a negligible share of Latvian exports.   
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Mexico have generally been stagnant.  Yevgeny Kuznetsov, “Mexico -- Towards a Second Generation 
NAFTA Agenda: Implications for National Innovation and Enterprise Upgrading Systems,” World 
Bank processed, February 2003.  Mexico faces many of the same challenges as Latvia.  Both are in 
danger of becoming low wage production sites for much larger, more productive, and wealthier 
neighbors.  And both are struggling to find ways to harness sizeable R&D establishments as a resource 
for wealth creation.  To date, both have made unsatisfactory progress in this regard.  
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Source: WIIW, 2001   
 
•  Exports generated by labor-intensive industries account for a growing share of 
exports in Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states and for a declining proportion 
of exports in the Czech Republic and Hungary.  In Latvia, the share of exports 
produced by labor intensive industries almost doubled in 5 years, growing from 
34% of exports in 1995 to 63% in 1999 and is the highest among all NMS’s.   
 















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Source: WIIW, 2001 
 
•  Latvia’s cumulative trade deficit was approximately $3.9 billion from 1997-2001. 
This consisted of a growing surplus in labor-intensive sectors, especially wood 
products and textiles, and a large deficit in knowledge-intensive sectors: 
chemicals, machinery, electrical and optical equipment, and transport equipment. 
   17
•  While there is ample evidence of growing intra-industry trade
14 in the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, Latvia’s performance is near the bottom of 
all NMS’s.  This suggests that Latvia’s industries and enterprises are not well 
integrated with industries and enterprises in other EU countries.  In other 
words, they are not part of EU value chains.  Compared to the early period of 
transition (and even more so with the pre-transition period), intra-industry 
trade between the more advanced NMS’s (the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Poland) and the EU has steadily increased whereas Latvia is 
clearly an outsider.  Most of the countries that have relatively low and stable 
intra-industry manufacturing trade have the largest share of non-manufactured 
goods in total exports.  In Latvia’s case, the low share of intra-industry trade 
suggests that a high proportion of country’s manufactured exports consist of 
relatively simple transformations of raw materials, processes that are not 
suited to a division of labor and activities across different countries.  The low 
share of intra-industry trade also suggests that Latvian enterprises do not have 
the skills required to become suppliers to foreign companies and find a higher 
value added niche in global value chains. 
 







































Sources: Eurostat COMEXT Database, WIIW Industrial Database, own calculations. 
 
 
                                                 
14   The ‘new’ trade theory suggests that intra-industry trade, measured by the share of simultaneous export 
and import of similar products, is motivated by product differentiation and economies of scale. Intra-
industry trade is measured by Grubel-Lloyd index (GL=1-￿ABS(xij+mij), where xij and mij are country 
i's export and import of NACE 3 digit sector j, respectively).   18
•  The skill composition of Latvia’s exports to the EU indicates a high concentration 
of exports produced in low and medium-low labor skill industries and a low 
proportion generated by skill-intensive industries (Taxonomy II). The upper skill 
segment, which is developing rapidly in more dynamic transitional economies (it 
grew by 2.5 times in Hungary in 5 years and accounted for 17% of Hungarian 
exports in 1999), is almost nonexistent in Latvia, which lags behind all European 
economies, including the NMS’s (Graph).   
 
Figure 9 Exports to the EU by Labor Skill Requirements:  







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Latvia Hungary
High-skill industries Medium-skill/white collar workers industries
Meduim-skill/blue collar worker industries Low-skill industries
 
Source: Austrian Institute of Economic Research, available at www.wifo.ac.at  
 
 
•  As the graph below indicates, Latvia is more heavily reliant on labor intensive 
exports, compared not only to existing EU member states, but also compared to 
Slovakia and Hungary.  Hungary’s share of labor intensive exports is comparable 
to that of Finland and Ireland. Hungary is also the only NMS with an over-
representation of technology driven industries in exports to the EU, while Latvia 
increasingly specializes in labor intensive industries (which require mainly low 
skilled labor) and its exports of technology driven industries are minimal. 
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Latvia Lithuania Estonia Poland Slovak Rep. Finland Hungary Ireland
Note: Market shares of industry clusters relative to country's total market shares in all imports of the EU.
Mainstream Labor-intensive Capital-intensive  Marketing-driven Technology-driven
 
Source: WIIW, 2001 
 
 
C. FDI  Flows 
 
In principle, FDI can play an important role in improving the competitiveness of the local 
manufacturing base.  For example, a recent UNCTAD study identified a strong 
relationship between inward FDI and manufacturing export performance in a number of 
countries. (UN, 1999: p. 244-255).
15 However, technology spillovers from foreign-owned 
firms to domestic firms do not emerge automatically.
16  Empirical studies conducted in 
Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia indicate that technology spillovers from foreign firms to 
local firms occur only occasionally and do not induce significant innovative activities 
within domestic firms.
17 Several factors account for the relatively low incidence of 
spillovers including:  
 
•  There is little evidence to suggest that local companies have the financial or 
technical capability to reverse engineer the production processes and technologies 
                                                 
15   UNIDO,  World Investment Report. 1999 Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of 
Development. UN. New York and Geneva.   
 
16   Technology spillovers are defined as the transfer of technology that could be externality (“learning-by-
watching”, reverse engineering or labor mobility) or linkage based (conscious and intentional transfer 
through supplier and customer contacts or networking). The distinction between these five observable 
mechanisms of technology-spillovers is an analytical approach and in practice they can often overlap. 
So it is highly probable that e.g. supplier- or customer-contacts are accompanied by “learning-by-
watching”.  
 
17   Günther, Jutta, The Significance of FDI for Innovation Activities within Domestic Firms: The Case of 
Central East European Transition Economies. Halle Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper 
No. 162, May 2002: www.iwh-halle.de/e/publik/disc/162.pdf 
 
Hunya, Gabor,  Recent Impacts of FDI on Growth and Restructuring in Central European Transition 
Countries. WIIW Research Report No. 284, May 2002.     20
introduced by foreign-owned firms.  In other words, local firms do not have the 
capacity to learn from foreign companies operating in their midst.  
•  Local companies cannot pay sufficient wages to attract workers from foreign-
owned companies.  Consequently, this potential spillover channel is negligible. 
•  Studies in Hungary (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Economic Research 
Institute of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2000), Slovenia 
and Estonia suggest that foreign-owned companies typically continue to rely on 
foreign suppliers.  They rarely develop local supplier networks or devote the time 
and resources needed to improve the technical competence of local suppliers.   
Thus, while FDI may lead to an increase in the technological sophistication of 
exports, without specific joint government/industry programs to foster local 
supplier networks, FDI does not automatically bring local supplier skills and 
competencies up to international norms.  
•  Inward FDI does not necessarily help local firms establish linkages with foreign 
customers. Foreign-owned firms produce mainly for export or for other foreign 
investment enterprises within the transitional countries.  
•  Joint R&D projects between foreign-owned firms and domestic companies rarely 
spring up spontaneously.  In the first place, local firms frequently do not have the 
local technical skills needed to participate in these projects. And in addition, 
foreign-owned firms acquire most of their required R&D in the context of their 
parent company’s global R&D strategy.  Foreign-owned firms have little scope 
for independent local R&D efforts.   
 
According to a recent comparison of Estonia and Latvia,
18 foreign-based manufacturing 
companies were attracted to Latvia mainly by an abundance of inexpensive labor.  By 
itself, this is not a bad thing if the initial attraction is just that – a first step in a process 
that will lure investors to Latvia for reasons other than low wages.   
 
          Table 1  FDI Stock in Knowledge Intensive Sectors, 2001 
In million of 
LAT 
As % of total 
FDI 
Publishing/printing 1.4  0.1% 
Chemicals 22.9  1.5% 
Rubber/Plastic products  4.3  0.3% 
Electrical/Electronic equipment  4.1  0.3% 
Precision Instruments  1.1  0.1% 
Post/telecommunication 117.2  7.8% 
Computer   9.3  0.6% 
R&D 1  0.1% 
Education 0.3  0.0% 
TOTAL  161.6  10.8% 
Excl. telecommunication  44.4  3.0% 
Source: FIAS Report 
 
                                                 
18    Cristián Contreras, Gertrud Kasemaa, Mobile Telecommunications Sector In Estonia And Latvia: 
Drivers Of Development.  Stockholm School of Economics, 2001.   21
To date, however, there is no indication that Latvia has succeeded in moving beyond this 
first step.  More than ¾ of total FDI was concentrated in low and medium-low 
technology industries.  And according to a recent FIAS analysis, knowledge intensive 
sectors, excluding telecommunications, only attracted 3% of the total FDI flows. 
 
Even though the FDI grew steadily in recent years, as the table below indicates, there is 
reason to believe that it generated limited knowledge transfers to the Latvian business 
community in terms of know-how, technology, or access of Latvian firms to global 
markets.  
 
Table 2 Foreign Investment Stock by Sector of Economy 
Sector 1997  1998  1999  2000  Total 1997-2000 
   millions of dollars  % of total 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
309.5 346.8 331.7  475.2  26.5% 
Financial Intermediation  179.3  264.9  252.1  429  20.3% 
Manufacturing   235.3  199.1  228.6  401.5  19.2% 
Wholesale and retail trade, 
maintenance and repairs 
74 185.2  217  349  14.9% 
Real estate, leasing, R&D, and other 
commercial activities 
18.4 50.4 98.5  203.3  6.7% 
Other investment  67.6  55.5  119.7  30.1  4.9% 
Electricity, gas and water supply  15.3  20.8  34.8  106.8  3.2% 
Hotels and restaurants  13.2  14.7  18.5  36.6  1.5% 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing  1.1  8.9  9.6  26.7  0.8% 
Health and social Work   7.6  7  6.7  14.7  0.7% 
Mining and quarrying  1.2  2.8  6.5  15.1  0.5% 
Construction 5.1  3.6  4.5  6.3  0.4% 
Other social and individual services  1.6  2.5  4.1  8.5  0.3% 
Education 0.9  0.9  1  1.3  0.1% 
Total  901.4  1162.6  1333.3  2,104.60 100.0% 




Furthermore, as the chart below indicates, Latvian manufacturing companies have had 
only a limited success to in attracting foreign investors to knowledge intensive industries. 
While FDI in low-technology and medium-low technology industries grew rapidly, the 
share of FDI in knowledge-based industries remained insignificant -- less than 0.8% in 
1999-2001.   
   22

























































































































































































































































































































Source : Bank of Latvia, BOP Statistics Division, Foreign direct investment stock in Latvia by kind of 
activity (http://www.bank.lv/izdevumi/Latvian/maksbil/2002-02/LMB7.xls)  
 
D.  The Forestry Sector: Microcosm of Latvia’s Problems and Prospects 
 
The forestry sector is a microcosm of Latvia’s problems -- and potential opportunities.  
The Government’s innovation policy targets the forestry sector as a potential source of 
high tech exports.  And indeed, its share of Latvia’s total exports increased rapidly since 
the early transition period.  As a result, the forestry sector now accounts for 
approximately 40% of Latvia’s total exports. 
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Source: Swedish National Board of Forestry, 2003
19 
 
                                                 
19   National Board of Forestry, Sweden: http://www.svo.se/    23
More importantly, despite Latvia’s rapidly rising trade deficit, in recent years the forestry 
sector generated a rapidly increasing trade surplus.  Indeed, without the forest sector 
surplus, Latvia’s overall trade deficit would be nearly 50% greater. 
 
Figure 13 Trade Balance of Latvia 





















































































Export of Forest Sector  Import of Forest Sector 
Export of Latvia  Import of Latvia
 
Source: Swedish National Board of Forestry, 2003 
 
 
However, the structure of Latvia’s forestry exports and forestry trade surplus cast serious 
doubt on the long term sustainability or desirability of these trends.  Approximately 70% 
of Latvia’s total forestry sector exports consist of sawnwood, roundwood, firewood, and 
plywood – products that require minimal processing and which generate limited value 
added in Latvia.  Thus, although Latvia has significant potential to generate more value 
added in the forestry and wood products sectors, it is only latent potential.  Latvia is not 
yet have the capacity to exploit this potential.
20   
 
                                                 
20   According to representatives of the Latvian forestry and wood sectors, building this capacity will 
require action on several fronts including: (i) Training architects and engineers to work with wood and 
wood products.  These skills and this know-how is currently absent in Latvia.  (ii) Reviving, restoring 
and renewing the capacity of teaching and research institutes in the forestry and wood sectors.   
According to many businessmen, most research institutes are working with obsolete equipment and 
their scientific cadre is not fully conversant with cutting edge knowledge.  Foreign and domestic firms 
operating in the Latvian market will not enter into joint R&D programs with these institutes until these 
deficiencies are remedied. (iii) Helping Latvian enterprises learn how to be more innovative.   
According to industry representatives, managers of most enterprises simply do not know how to 
market and produce new, niche products  or how to connect their firms with large global players in the 
wood and forestry industry.    24



























Source: Swedish National Board of Forestry, 2003 
 
This export structure contrasts markedly with that of Finland.   Whereas Latvia’s forestry 
sector exports are concentrated almost entirely in labor intensive activities which lead to 
little value added or processing in Latvia, most of Finland’s exports are in high value 
added, technology intensive activities. 
 
Figure 15 Exports of Forest Cluster in Latvia and Finland 
 
























































































































































































Source: Swedish National Board of Forestry, 2003 
 
What does all this imply for Latvia?  Simply put, Latvia needs to focus not just on 
promoting high tech activities -- important though they may be. Instead, Latvia should 
put more effort into building an integrated forestry sector cluster.  In Finland, this cluster   25
encompasses a wide range of skill and knowledge intensive inter-linked activities, as the 
following chart indicates. 
     




Indeed, as numerous studies have shown, a rich natural resource endowment need not be 
a curse nor does it have to be an obstacle to knowledge intensive development.  Rather, it 
can be a platform for prosperity, based on specialization in knowledge intensive, high 
value added activities.
21  Achieving this result is major policy challenge for Latvia’s 
national innovation system. 
                                                 
21   For an excellent discussion of the conditions that lead to rapid resource based growth see, William F. 
Maloney, “Innovation and Resource Based Growth in Latin America,” Economia, Fall 2002.  Also see, 
Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, “From Natural Resources to High Tech Production: The Evolution 
of Industrial Competitiveness in Sweden and Finland,” Center for Economic Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 3084, available at www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3804.asp  .  It is interesting to note 
in this regard, that between 1976 and 1990, R&D in the Finnish forestry products sector rose from 0% 
to 1% of value added and from 0% to 3% in the paper sector.  If Latvia hopes to build an integrated 
forestry sector cluster, along the lines of the one in Finland, it will be necessary to increase forestry-
based R&D and improve the quality of Latvia’s forestry and wood processing R&D institutes.    26
III. Benchmarking  Latvia 
 
Three recent studies – the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the 
World Bank Knowledge Economy Index, and Porter and Stern’s analysis of national 
innovation capacity -- highlight some of the complex challenges that Latvia will have to 
surmount if it is to create a globally competitive, high value added 21
st century economy.   
 
A. Global  Competitiveness  Report 
 
The 2002-2003 Global Competitiveness Report seeks to understand “the microeconomic 
bases of a nation’s prosperity measured by its level of GDP per capita. The focus is on 
whether current prosperity is sustainable, and on the specific areas that must be addressed 
if GDP per capita is to achieve higher levels in the future.”
22  Microeconomic 
competitiveness is important, the report observes, because “sound monetary and fiscal 
policies and the removal of distortions in exchange rates and other prices will eliminate 
impediments to productivity, but microeconomic foundations must be in place if 
productivity is actually to increase….Without microeconomic reforms, growth will be 




The Microeconomic Competitiveness Index (MICI) attempts to measure the quality of a 
country’s microeconomic foundations of development.  The index is a weighted average 
of two inter-related sets of variables:  (i) “the sophistication with which domestic 
companies or foreign subsidiaries operating in the country compete, and (ii) the quality of 
the microeconomic business environment.”
24  The first set of variables attempts to 
measure whether a nation’s companies have the managerial, organizational and technical 
capacity to shift from a competitive model based on the production of simple products 
with low wage labor to a competitive model based on the production of sophisticated 
products utilizing sophisticated production processes and high wage, skilled labor.   
 
The second set of variables measures, in effect, measures the extent of cluster 
development in a particular country.  As the report observes, “In developing countries, 
clusters are normally shallow or underdeveloped. Firms compete on the basis of cheap 
labor or local natural resources and they depend heavily on imported components, 
machinery and technology.  Specialized local infrastructure and institutions are absent. 
As economies advance, clusters advance and deepen to include suppliers of specialized 
inputs, components, machinery and services; specialized infrastructure; and institutions 
providing specialized training, education, information, research, and technical 
support….The challenge for an economy is to move from isolated firms to an array of 
                                                 
22  Michael E. Porter, “Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the 
Microeconomic Competitiveness Index,” in Peter K. Cornelius (ed.), The Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003, Oxford University Press 2003, p. 24. 
 
23   Ibid., p. 29 
 
24    Ibid., p. 25   27
clusters, and upgrade the sophistication of clusters to more advanced activities.”
25  For 
countries such as Latvia, “Cluster linkages, especially the quality of local suppliers and 
the presence of specialized local research and training providers” are critical determinants 
of national competitiveness.   
 
The index and resulting benchmarking exercise presents a mixed picture for Latvia.  On 
the one hand, Latvia ranks 45
th out of 80 countries participating in this year’s survey.
26  
Latvia’s ranking is more or less equal to that of Poland, but behind every cc except 
Romania and Bulgaria.  Latvia is two notches behind Greece, the weakest EU member in 
terms of most science and technology indicators.  Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia, by 
comparison, are only a few notches behind Norway, New Zealand, Korea and Spain, 
countries that generally score relatively well on most innovation indicators.  Seen from 
this perspective, Latvia has no room for complacency.  Much work remains to be done. 
 
Table 3 Global Competitiveness Indexes for Latvia and Selected Economies 




Quality of the National 
Business Environment 
Ranking 
Slovenia  27 26  27 
Hungary  28 29  29 
Estonia  30 36  28 
Czech Republic  34 34  34 
Lithuania  40 39  39 
Slovak Republic  42 43  40 
LATVIA  45 48  42 
Poland  46 46  45 
Croatia  52 53  54 
Turkey  54 56  55 
Russian Federation  58 62  56 
Romania  67 69  64 
Bulgaria  68 72  63 
Ukraine  69 66  69 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report, 2002-2003 
 
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that the picture is by no means bleak.  On 
the contrary, Latvia is one of the few middle income countries (along with Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Hungary among the NMS’s) that is considered to have a potentially bright 
future because “the platform is in place to support higher GDP per capita if macro, 
                                                 
25    Ibid., p. 28 
  
26   It is important to stress at the outset of this benchmarking discussion that a country’s current rankings 
must not be confused with its destiny.  Many formerly high ranking countries tumbled in the rankings 
over time and, more importantly, many of today’s high ranking countries started from a much lower 
ranking.  Good policies, hard work and political commitment and consensus, much more than current 
rankings, are the major determinants of future rankings and prosperity.   28
political or other constraints can be eased.”
27  What sort of constraints are most critical 
can be discerned from the fact that Latvia scores lowest (relative to its overall ranking) on 
the company operations and strategy sub-index.  Countries in this situation have 
companies that are not competing with sophisticated enough strategies.  Critical 
microeconomic competitiveness objectives, therefore, should include helping companies 
improve the sophistication of production processes, become more customer oriented, and 
more attuned to marketing.  Research collaboration also becomes important as companies 
strive to produce world quality products.  Finally, cluster formation and development, 
along with efforts to develop higher value added links with international customers and 
suppliers, should also become important components of an overall company development 
strategy.   
 
However, just as interesting as the rankings is the discussion of the challenges that any 
economy must surmount as it moves through three stages of economic development.  
Nations at different levels of development face distinctly different challenges, 
competitive advantages, and modes of competition, the report observes.  In the Factor-
Driven stage, firms produce relatively simple, low-skill intensive, low value added 
products.  Technology is assimilated primarily through imports or FDI.  Firms compete 
primarily on the basis of price.  In the Investment-Driven stage, efficiency in mass 
production is the dominant source of competitive advantage.   Technology is accessed 
through licensing, joint ventures and FDI.  Countries at this stage of development 
assimilate technology as well as develop the capacity to improve on it. Companies are 
capable of producing more sophisticated products and, as a result, are able to find more 
lucrative niches in global value chains and the global division of labor.  Finally, in the 
Innovation-Driven stage, growth is driven primarily by the development and sale of new 
technologies and innovative products.  Competitive advantage is based primarily on the 
ability to produce innovative products that are at the global technology frontier.  
 
Each stage has its own unique set of challenges and policy requirements.  During the 
“Factor-Driven” phase, the main challenge is the establishment of policies that are 
conducive to the organization of efficient markets for land, labor and capital and the 
establishment of a business climate that supports capital accumulation.  During the 
“Investment-Driven” stage, the main public policy task is the absorption and diffusion of 
knowledge produced elsewhere and the integration of the national economy into the 
global division of labor.  And finally, during the “Innovative-Driven” stage, public policy 
must foster the rapid and repeated development and commercialization of new 
technologies.   
 
The authors note that “many of the failures in economic development in recent years 
involve countries getting stuck at critical junctures of economic transition:  between 
Factor Driven and Investment Driven or Between Investment Driven and Innovation 
Driven stages….The shift from one phase of development to the next often requires new 
ways of organizing governments, markets and enterprises so it is not altogether surprising 
                                                 
27   Russia, in comparison to Latvia, is listed as a so called overachiever. It’s per capita GDP, although 
bolstered by high oil prices, is not judged to be sustainable based on its overall microeconomic 
competitiveness.    29
therefore that many countries fail at making appropriate transitions or even fail to 
recognize that such a transition is needed….Ironically, old strategies become new 
weaknesses.”   
 
This suggests that the challenge which Latvia set for itself – becoming an innovative 
economy -- is especially daunting.  In effect, Latvia must navigate not one, but two, 
simultaneous transitions.  First, to succeed in the transition for the Factor-Driven to the 
Investment-Driven stage, Latvia it must upgrade the technological sophistication of its 
existing industries by absorbing knowledge produced outside Latvia.  Unfortunately, 
current Latvian policies are not particularly geared to this challenge.  And at the same 
time, to succeed in the Innovation-Driven stage Latvia will need to reform its NIS so that 
it makes better use its strong human capital endowment and historic tradition of scientific 
excellence.  But as this report (and many others) suggest, Latvia is not particularly strong 
in this area either.   
 
 
B.  World Bank Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 
 
The World Bank’s KEI presents a mixed picture of Latvia’s progress toward becoming 
an innovative economy.  For example, relative to its per capita GDP, Latvia’s KEI score 
is higher than expected.  Nevertheless, in absolute terms, Latvia is behind all NMS’s 
except Bulgaria and Romania.  In other words, Latvia is doing better than the statistical 
average.  But Latvia is not competing against the average.  It is competing against other 
NMS’s and, from that perspective, it is not doing well.  
 
Figure 17 KE Index in Latvia and Selected European Countries 
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Several key conclusions emerge from this analysis: 
 
•  Although Latvia belongs to the middle group of the countries, within this group it 
ranks lowest in terms of both KEI and GDP.  Furthermore, the gap that Latvia 
needs to bridge in order to move to a leading position within this middle group is 
almost as large as the gap between leading NMS’s (Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Hungary and Estonia) and Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden.  In other 
words, Latvia’s task is daunting. 
•  Although Latvia has significantly improved it’s Economic and Incentive Regime 
score, it is still only in the middle rank among NMS’s. 
  











































•  All NMS’s rank relatively high on the education index and they all cluster 
together at the high end of the scale.  In other words, they all do relatively well on 
this dimension.  But as the next section will highlight, the key issue for Latvia and 
other NMS’s is not educational attainment per se but rather, their ability harness 
this educated labor force for high value added, knowledge intensive goods and 
services production.  In this respect, as we will demonstrate below, Latvia is not 
doing so well.  
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•  With respect to the ICT index, Latvia is in the middle rank of NMS’s, but still 
does reasonably well in absolute terms.  
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•  Latvia scores lowest in both absolute and relative terms on the Innovation Index.  
While all NMS’s rank low on this variable, Latvia ranks below most NMS’s.  And 
Latvia has made no appreciable progress on this variable since 1995.  
 







































In sum, this benchmarking exercise suggests that Latvia has a highly educated 
population, fairly good communication links with the outside world, and an acceptable 
economic incentive regime.  Improvements can undoubtedly continue in all of these 
areas.  But Latvia’s fundamental weakness remains the NIS:  Latvia does not yet have an 
effective system for converting knowledge – both domestic and foreign – into wealth.   
 
 
C.  Porter and Stern:  National Innovation Capacity 
 
A third benchmarking exercise ranks countries according to their “national innovation 
capacity,” which is defined as a “country’s potential…to produce a stream of 
commercially relevant innovations….National innovation capacity is also distinct from 
both the purely scientific or technical achievements of an economy, which do not 
necessarily involve the economic application of new technology.”
28  According to this 
analysis, national innovation capacity depends on four broad elements:   
 
•  The proportion of scientists and engineers. 
                                                 
28    Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern, “National Innovation Capacity,” Chapter 2.2 in Porter, Sachs, 
Cornelius, McArthur and Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2002.   33
•  The common innovation infrastructure which is defined as the broad set of 
policies affecting innovation including tax incentives, the protection of 
intellectual property, anti-trust enforcement and openness to competition.  It also 
includes such purely scientific technological factors as excellence in basic 
research.  But in general, the innovation infrastructure is more closely related to 
general business climate issues than to technology measures.   
•  The cluster-specific environment for innovation.
29  This dimension of innovation 
capacity recognizes that “the commercialization of new technologies takes place 
disproportionately in clusters  -- geographic concentrations of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular field.”  This in turn leads to “the 
presence of high quality and specialized inputs, a context that encourages 
investment coupled with intense local rivalry, pressure and insight gleaned from 
sophisticated local demand, and the local presence of related and supporting 
industries.”  The key point here is that isolated firms are at a competitive 
disadvantage.  A precondition for success in today’s global economy is a dense 
web of relationships between suppliers, customers, competitors, researchers and 
universities. Establishing this dense web is a pre-requisite for innovation and a 
challenge for innovation policy. 
•  The quality of linkages is the glue that binds the other elements together.  This 
variable measures the communications links between these various institutions.  
But communications links in this context do not refer to such mechanical items as 
ICT and the internet.  Instead, they refer to the formal and informal social 
organizations and networks that bind organizations and institutions to each other 
within the cluster. “Without strong linkages,” the authors explain, a nation’s 
upstream scientific and technical advances can diffuse to other countries more 
quickly than they can be exploited at home.” 
 
On the basis of this Innovation Capacity Index, Latvia ranks 41
st out of 75 countries.  
Once again, Latvia is behind every CC except Bulgaria and Romania.  More interesting 
than the composite ranking, however, is Latvia’s relative standing on the four 
components.  Latvia, along with such other transition countries as Russia and Ukraine 
and many NMS’s, has a comparatively high ranking on the Scientists and Engineers sub-
index coupled with a much lower ranking on the innovation and linkages components.   
In other words, Latvia possesses an abundance of one critical pre-requisite – a technically 
educated labor force.  But according to this and other benchmarking studies, a well 
trained labor force will not generate an innovative economy unless a country also 
                                                 
29   For a discussion of clusters see Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Macmillan, 1990.  Also 
see, Innovative Regions: The Importance of Place and Networks in the Innovative Economy, Report 
Sponsored by the Heinz Endowments (www.heinz.org ) and the Pittsburgh Regional Alliance, October 
1999 and Shahid Yusuf, Innovative East Asia: The Future of Growth, World Bank, 2003, especially 
Chapter 4, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  For interesting examples of how developed economies embark 
on the process of establishing clusters, see Israel Bio-Plan 2000-2010, available from the Office of the 
Chief Scientist at http://www.moit.gov.il/tamas_level2_English.asp?sid=1434 .   A l s o  s e e ,  O r j a n  
Solvell, Goran Lindqvist, and Christian Ketels, The Cluster Initiative Greenbook, 2003 and the 
presentations at The Competitiveness Institute 6
th Global Conference: Innovative Clusters – A New 
Challenge, September 17-19, 2003, Gothenburg, Sweden available at http://www.tciconference.org . 
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possesses the institutions and mechanisms needed to convert this raw material into 
useable wealth.  This is still lacking in Latvia.  The recommendations outlined below are 
designed to overcome this weakness. 
 
Table 4 National Innovation Capacity Index and Sub-Indexes 
















 Rank  Index  Rank Index  Rank Index  Rank Index  Rank  Index 
United States  1  30.3  6  4.3  1  8.1  1  10.9  1  7.1 
Finland 2  29.1  7  4.2  4  7.3  2  10.9  3  6.7 
Israel 11  26.5  19  3.9  14  6.8  15  9.1  2  6.7 
Singapore 13  26.0  17  3.9  2  7.4  17  8.9  15  5.8 
Ireland 16  25.4  12  4.0  16  6.6  16  9.1  16  5.7 
Denmark 19  25.2  10  4.1  19  6.4  20  8.8  13  5.9 
Iceland 20  24.8  4  4.3  20  6.2  18  8.8  20  5.5 
Czech Republic  26  21.3  36  3.2 26  5.5  29  7.9 29  4.7 
Estonia 27  21.2  25  3.8  36  5.0  36  7.4  27  5.0 
Hungary 28  21.1  34  3.3  25  5.6  38  7.2  25  5.0 
Russia 30  20.6  3  4.4  52  4.1  30  7.8  42  4.3 
Slovenia 31  20.4  20  3.9  32  5.2  50  6.8  33  4.5 
Ukraine 32  20.3  21  3.9  56  4.1  28  7.9  35  4.4 
Slovakia 34  20.0  26  3.7  49  4.5  35  7.6  44  4.2 
Poland 36  19.6  32  3.5  50  4.5  37  7.2  36  4.4 
Lithuania 37  19.2  24  3.8  55  4.1  45  6.9  34  4.4 
Latvia 41  18.5  37  3.1  51  4.2  43  7.0  47  4.1 
Bulgaria 50  16.9  27  3.7  64  3.6  67  5.8  56  3.8 
Romania 55  16.3  33  3.4  65  3.6  53  6.6  73  2.7 
Source: Porter, M. and Scott Stern, 1999   35
IV. Reforming  Latvia’s  National Innovation System 
 
As the benchmarking analyses suggest, it is unlikely that Latvia will achieve its goal of 
becoming an innovative economy unless Latvian officials take steps to promote the 
technology upgrading of traditional Latvian industrial sectors and also generate closer 
links between (i) the domestic enterprise sector and the domestic R&D sector, (ii) the 
domestic R&D sector and the international R&D sector, (iii) domestic enterprises and 
global technology markets, and (iv) SMEs and dynamic large enterprises, both inside and 
outside of Latvia.  None of these linkages currently exist, at least not in sufficiently 
strong form.  Even worse, the enterprise sector and R&D sector seem to be developing in 
total isolation from each other.  As a result, on the rare occasion when innovation does 
occur, it has no connection with the output or technical capacity of the domestic R&D 
system.  And decisions about what R&D to conduct are taken without any regard to the 
needs of industry.  The net effect is an R&D system which is an overhead expense rather 
than a resource for generating wealth. 
 
A.  Enterprise Sector – Little Innovation and Less R&D 
 
The sad but true situation is that Latvian enterprises are not very innovative. According to 
a recent survey, only 19% of Latvian enterprises conducted any innovative activity,
30 
defined as the introduction (or intended future introduction) of a new product or 
production process.  This is much lower than in EU countries or in NMS’s like Estonia 
(36%) and Lithuania (27%).   
 
An overwhelming preponderance of the innovative activity that does occur takes place in 
large firms which are more than four times as likely to innovate as small or medium size 
enterprises.  Moreover, although they comprise only 3% of the total sample, large 
enterprises accounted for 52% of the total spending on innovation. 
 







Number of innovative 
enterprises 
Share of innovative 
enterprises (%) 
10-19 2113  268  12.7  Small enterprises 
20-49 1338  231  17.3 
50-99 495  140  28.3  Medium enterprises 
100-249 297  118  39.7 
Large entreprises  ≥250 155  90  58.1 
Total   4398  847  19.3 
Source: Latvia Survey of Innovation Activities, 2002.   
                                                 
30   According to the innovation survey (Chapter 3, page 20), an innovation has taken place if a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service) has been introduced into the market or if a new or 
significantly improved process has been introduced into the enterprise. The innovation is based on the 
results of new technological developments, new combinations of the existing technology or other 
combinations, or utilization of other knowledge acquired by a specified enterprise. The innovation can 
be new to the specified enterprise but it needs not necessarily be new to the market. Changes of solely 
aesthetic nature are not considered as innovation.   
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Three features of Latvia innovation activity merit particular attention.  First, most of the 
LVL 142 million innovation spending in Latvia in 2001 took the form of acquiring new 
machinery and equipment, primarily from outside Latvia.  Intramural research (R&D 
conducted inside the firm) was a relatively minor source of innovation.  What little 
intramural research did take place was concentrated in only one or two sectors.   
Similarly, extramural research (R&D done outside the firm by R&D institutes working 
under contract to an enterprise) was also quite small and concentrated in only one or two 
sectors.  Finally, Latvian enterprises do not appear to be particularly active in acquiring 
external knowledge either in the form of licensing technology or purchasing patents from 
abroad for use in Latvia.   
 
To a certain extent, this is not surprising given the fact that Latvia’s industrial structure 
tends to be concentrated in traditional sectors. The in-house R&D intensity in the US 
food and wood industries, for example, is much lower than in the electronics industry. 
The situation is similar in Latvia: the share of firms conducting R&D in-house is almost 
twice as high in “Knowledge Sectors” (53%) as in non-knowledge sectors.
31  However, 
by developing the absorption capacities of the traditional sectors, promoting technology 
upgrading in Latvian enterprises, and cultivating closer links between Latvian R&D 
institutes and Latvian enterprises, Latvia would still appear to have considerable scope 
for increasing domestic demand for the R&D output of Latvian scientific institutions.  
Figure 22 Embodied Technology Flows in the United States 
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Source: OECD, 1998 
                                                 
31   For details, see FIAS Report, p. 48.   37
 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Latvian enterprises currently tend not to conduct 
research and they tend not to conduct or purchase R&D.  In this respect, even innovating 
Latvian enterprises are relatively inert.  They prefer turnkey technology solutions in the 
form of technology embedded in imported machinery and equipment.  In this respect, 
they are no different from enterprises in other CC countries. 
  





Intramural reserch and experimental development
Acquisition of R&D from other enterprises/ organisations
(extramural R&D)
Acquisition of machinery and equipment
Acquisition of other external knowledge
Training, market introduction of innovations, design of
other preparations for production
 
Source: Latvia Survey of Innovation Activities 
 
























Source: Slavo Radosevic, “(Mis)match Between Demand and Supply for Technology: Innovation, R&D, 
and Growth Issues in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” processed 2003.  
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There is nothing wrong, of course, with purchasing technology embodied in machinery 
and equipment.  Germany, Japan and Korea became dominant, innovative economies by 
importing machinery and technology and incorporating it into the domestic production 
processes.  However, firms in these countries operated under the auspices of an 
innovation and economic development strategy that was deliberately designed around a 
policy of technology absorption and diffusion.  Unfortunately, this sort of policy 
coherence seems to be missing in Latvia.   
Second, relatively equal proportions of both innovative and non-innovative enterprises 
complain about financing costs, the risks of innovation, and the lack of appropriate 
financial instruments.  Yet one group of enterprises innovates and another does not.   
Clearly, factors other than those enumerated above determine the propensity to innovate.  
Latvia should focus on identifying these factors and then searching for mechanisms to 
address these issues.  This is not to say that Latvia should not make any effort to lower 
the cost and risk of innovation.  These issues should be addressed because they will 
improve enterprise performance and the business climate in general.  But Latvian 
officials should not labor under the illusion that, by themselves, addressing these issues 
will increase innovative activity. 
 













Excessive perceived economic risks  55,43  57,33  49,82 
Innovation costs too high  77,96  79,49  73,44 
Lack of appropriate sources of 
finance  84,37 86,28 78,74 
Organizational rigidities within the 
enterprise  35,48 36,67 31,94 
Lack of qualified personnel  44,40  43,55  46,90 
Lack of information on technology  32,04  31,30  34,24 
Lack of information on markets  33,96  33,12  36,44 
Insufficient flexibility of regulations 
or standards  32,70 31,17 37,20 
Lack of customer responsiveness to 
new goods or services  39,48  39,24  40,17 
Source: Latvian Innovation Survey 
 
Finally, the innovation survey suggests that a firm’s organizational capacity appears to be 
a critical determinant of whether it innovates. Simply stated, firms with more 
sophisticated organizational structures tend to be more innovative than firms with 
unsophisticated structures.  This is also consistent with the finding from the recent FIAS 
survey showing that firms with more extensive linkages to foreign or multinational 
suppliers and foreign or multinational customers tend to be more innovative.  Both 
studies conclude that a firm’s internal capacity to get out of its cocoon and look beyond 
the most immediate horizon seems to be a critical determinant of whether it will be   39
innovative.
32  This suggests that Latvia’s national innovation strategy should include 
policies to help firms improve their management structures and establish more extensive 
linkages with global markets.   
 
Figure 25 Strategic and organizational changes in innovative and non-innovative 
enterprises in 1999-2001, % 
Source: Latvia Survey of Innovation Activities, 2002.   
 
                                                 
32   Domestic and international competition should, in theory, motivate firms to become more innovative. 
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many Latvian firms may be overwhelmed by competition.  
They simply do not have the organizational, managerial and financial capacity to innovate, absorb and 
adapt new technology, and respond to rapidly changing market demands.  If so, entrepreneurial and 
managerial skill – even more so than greater access to modern technology -- may be the main factor 
inhibiting innovation.  Thus, from a public policy perspective, greater attention to management and 
entrepreneurship may be as important as R&D or technology commercialization policy. 
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0
Strategic changes
Introduction of advanced management techniques 
Introduction of new organisational structures
Changes in the enterprise's marketing concept
Significant changes in the aesthetic appearance or
design
Innovative enterprises Non-innovative enterprises  40
V.  Latvia’s NIS – Change without Reform  
 
A. Production  of  Knowledge 
 
Unfortunately, the existing Latvian NIS is not geared to meeting these challenges.  Nor 
have any of the changes that occurred in the past 12 years moved the system closer to this 
goal.  On the contrary, most of the changes to date were designed to preserve the existing 
NIS in its old Soviet form.  This preservation strategy was predicated on the assumption 
that the resumption of growth and aggregate demand in the Latvian economy would lead 
to a resumption of demand for R&D.  In other words, the old Soviet relations between 
R&D and the enterprise sector would be restored as soon as the pace of economic activity 
accelerated from the immediate post-transition trough.  That has not materialized.   
Aggregate demand and industrial production are both up, but demand for R&D has not 
accelerated.
33  Consequently, preservation has proven illusory.  Reform was postponed, 
but at the expense of weakening Latvia’s R&D capacity.  As a result, Latvia faces the 
worst of both worlds – change without fundamental reform and a weak NIS at a time 
when a strong NIS is an increasing imperative for growth.  It was initially expected that 
preservation would be the least painful, least expensive strategy since it would enable 
Latvia to preserve its rich legacy of R&D excellence.  But now it is turning out that this is 
a very expensive strategy since Latvia is in danger of losing what little R&D capacity 
remains.  
 
Technology development during the Soviet period can be compared to a river flowing 
downhill.  R&D institutes were at the top of the hill, performing fundamental research.  
Their knowledge and scientific findings flowed down to branch or applied research 
institutes which conducted the additional R&D, including the detailed design and 
engineering operations, required to transform basic research into useable production 
technologies and products.  Enterprises were at the end of the stream, passively receiving 
technology developed in upstream branch institutes and utilizing it to produce goods and 
services.  While this approach generated major scientific achievements, it also had 
serious economic shortcomings.  For example: 
 
•  Research was compartmentalized on the basis of technical specialties.  This 
restricted the cross fertilization of ideas and multi-disciplinary new technical 
developments. 
•  Research capacity was (and remains today) concentrated in public research 
institutes.  As a matter of policy, educational institutions and especially (non-
defense) enterprises had little or no research capacity and were not expected to 
play an active role in technology development;  
•  Enterprises were passive recipients of knowledge supplied by others and 
generated elsewhere.  They had no incentive to adapt or utilize new technologies 
since doing so would disrupt production operations and fulfillment of the “plan.” 
                                                 
33  For a fuller development of this argument ee, Slavo Radosevic, “Patterns of Preservation, Restructuring, 
and Survival: Science and Technology Policy in Russia in the Post-Soviet Era,” Research Policy 32 
(2003) 1105-1124.     41
Moreover, technology development proceeded with little feedback from 
customers or suppliers.   
•  The Soviet technology system did not cultivate a demand for technology by the 
enterprise sector; it did not develop the enterprise sector’s ability to search for 
technology produced elsewhere and adapt it for use in the enterprise; and it 
certainly did not encourage development of technology by and in enterprises.  As 
a result, the enterprise sector was divorced from both the supply and demand for 
technology.  
 
Latvia inherited this technology development model and it has continued operating, more 
or less intact, today.  Unfortunately, this model is distinctly unsuited for building 
competitive industries and enterprises that can thrive and prosper in the EU and other 
global markets.
34  Specifically, in successful market economies: 
 


























                                                 
34   The following discussion and diagram of the Industrial Technology Development System are derived 
from Erik Arnold, Martin Bell, John Bessant and Peter Brimble, Enhancing Policy and Institutional 
Support for Industrial Technology Development in Thailand: The Overall Policy Framework and the 
Development of the Industrial Innovation System, World Bank processed, 2000. 
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Organizational Structures  42
•  Business enterprises are at the center of the industrial technology system (See 
Figure, above).  They generate both the supply of technology as well as the 
demand for technology.  Moreover, most of the technology used by industry is 
produced  in the industrial sector by the industrial sector, rather than in 
independent research laboratories and institutes. 
•  The enterprise sector finances most of the R&D performed in a country and also 
conducts most of the R&D, including that portion of R&D financed by the public 
sector.   
•  R&D is only the tip of the technology development process (Figure 2) which, in 
addition to R&D includes such non-R&D activities as: (i) skills for acquiring, 
using and operating technologies at rising levels of complexity, productivity and 
quality and (ii) design, engineering, and associated managerial capabilities to 
acquire technologies, develop a continuous stream of improvements and generate 
innovations.  Different skills are most relevant at different stages of technological 
development.  For example, R&D is most relevant for firms that are closing in on 
the technological frontier or already at the frontier.  Technology acquisition and 
utilization skills, on the other hand, are most relevant for firms that are at the 
technology acquisition, assimilation or deepening stages.
35   
 



















Several policy-oriented conclusions flow from this comparison.   
                                                 
35   This analysis draws extensively from the discussion in Martin Bell, Knowledge Resources, Innovation  
Capabilities and Sustained Competitiveness in Thailand: Transforming the Policy Process, Report 
Prepared for the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand, (Funded by the 
World Bank  via IDF Grant No.TF050237), January 2003.  
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•  First, Latvia’s existing innovation and R&D policies which place public 
institutions at the center of the technology development process should gradually 
be replaced with policies that place industrial firms at the center of this process.   
•  Second, technology policy should recognize that a dense network of interactions 
and linkages – between enterprises and knowledge sources on the one hand and 
between enterprises and customers on the other – are critical aspects of the 
technology development process.  A key objective of public policy should be to 
foster these linkages, interactions and feedback processes.  As Latvia joins the 
EU, it will have unparalleled access to dynamic industrial and research partners.  
The task for Latvia is finding ways to exploit these potential linkages to the 
fullest. 
•  Third, as the diagram above suggests, technology policy should not be limited to 
promoting R&D.  A much broader focus is needed, with a stress on technology 
creation, including both R&D and design and engineering skills, technology 
acquisition, and technology use.   These are all vital dimensions of technology 
development.  Indeed, the non-R&D dimensions of technology development may 
be especially important for Latvia since most Latvian industries are not engaged 
in R&D, are far from the technological frontier, and do not require cutting edge 
R&D to improve their competitive standing.  For these firms, assistance in honing 
skills related to technology acquisition and use may be much more relevant than 
additional public R&D funding. 
 
Put differently, the current R&D system is simply not a viable or effective instrument for 
creating a modern, innovative economy.  For example:   
 
•  The Latvian innovation system shrank dramatically since the early days of 
transition.  With 17,000 researchers, Latvia was a major center of R&D in the 
former Soviet Union.  Most of these scientists and engineers were engaged in 
defense related activities.  But as defense orders dried up, the number of research 
personnel declined dramatically.  Unfortunately, shrinkage is not the same as 
structural reform.  
Table 7 Changes in R&D Personnel in Latvia, 1989-1999 
Employed in Science  1990 1993 1996 1999 2000 
Total number of employed persons  30,700  8,536  4,744  4,301  4,280 
Total  number  of  researchers  17,700  3,999 2,839 2,626 2,590 
Researchers  with  degrees  3,710 1,977 1,491 1,492 1,495 
Source: European Trend Chart on Innovation, 2001 
 
•  Latvia’s remaining innovation system is small, with only about 4000 personnel.  
Therefore, to generate a critical mass of R&D with this small base, Latvia will 
need to focus its R&D efforts in a few key areas. 
•  R&D personnel are ageing and not being replaced by new, younger cadres.  This 
is true both of R&D personnel as well as university professors in scientific 
disciplines. 
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Table 8 Age Distribution of Researchers in Latvia, 2000 
  Age  <35  36-45  46-55  56-65  >65 
%  3.1  17.4 32.4 36.5 10.6 
Source: Data of the Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia 
 
•  As the two charts below indicate, most university students (70%) prefer to study 
liberal arts, business and law rather than science and engineering (less than 15%).  
Therefore, the system is not generating enough new science and engineering 
students to renew the rapidly ageing existing cadre.  Furthermore, Latvia is 
generating new science and engineering graduates at a rate that is less than half of 
the rate of the EU as a whole and less than a third of the rate of Ireland and 
Finland.  This is not the least bit surprising.  Why study science and engineering if 
there is no demand in Latvia for these skills?
36  Nevertheless, these trends do not 
bode well for Latvia’s future scientific and innovative potential.   
 
Figure 28 New S&E Graduates in 2000 














New S&E graduates (‰ of 20 -
29 years age class) in 2000 or the
closest year
 
Source: Eurostat, Trendchart S&T Indicators, 2003, available at www.trendchart.org 
 
                                                 
36   Although there may not be demand in Latvia for these skills, Latvians with high quality scientific and 
education skills will soon be able to work elsewhere in the EU.  In the first instance, this will help 
Latvians, although it will not necessarily generate any immediate benefits for the Latvian economy.  
However, over the longer run, this is where emigration and return migration can play a useful role.  
Latvians can obtain training inside and outside Latvia, work outside Latvia for a while, and return 
when and if demand arises with skills, knowledge, and contacts which they can use inside Latvia.  This 
process of outmigration and subsequent inmigration has proven to be enormously beneficial for the 
development of Korea, Taiwan, and India.  It is also important to note that Latvian firms do not have to 
fill their managerial ranks only with Latvian managers.  Indeed, in the EU context, Finnish or French 
managers might be preferable.    45
Table 9 Breakdown of Education Programs by Area 
Area  Number of programs 
Social sciences  2,953 
Education 744 
Humanities, arts  648 
Services 455 
Agriculture, forestry  383 
Computer sciences  358 
Health care  269 
Engineering, industrial vocations  194 
Other programs  40 
Source: European Trend Chart on Innovation, 2001 
 
•  Government R&D spending is small, both as a percent of GDP (0.48%), in 
absolute terms, and relative to other NMS’s.  For example, such countries as 
Finland and Denmark with twice the population generate 100 times as much R&D 
spending as Latvia. 
 
Figure 29 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP, 2001  

















Public R&D expenditures  Business expenditures on R&D
 
Sources: EUROSTAT, R&D statistics and Trendchart. 
 
 
In 2001 Latvia invested $81million in R&D, four times as much as in 1995, but roughly 
equal to what Ford, General Motors, Siemens or Ericsson spend in one week and a 
fraction of what they spend per researcher. 
37   
                                                 
37   Another interesting comparison is with Oxford University in the UK which has 2500 researchers in 
science and medicine, 2000 doctoral students in various scientific disciplines and an annual research   46
 
Table 10 R&D Expenditures in  2001 




Ford Motor Co, USA  7,400  20,879 
General Motors Corp., USA  6200  16,986 
Siemens AG, Germany  6,028  12,455 
Ericsson, Sweden   4,516  53,002 
Finland 4,422.6  84,073 
Denmark 3,604.2  101,100 
Latvia 81  8,719 
Source : OECD, 2002 ; Eurostat 2003 ; calculations by the authors 
 
•  Government R&D policy papers refer to five priority areas – ICT, electronics, 
material sciences, pharmaceutical/ biotechnology, and wood chemistry.  But 
actual government spending bears no relationship to stated government priorities.  
Instead, limited government financial resources are spread over 14 areas.  These 
14 research fields were defined in the early 1990s and have not been revised 
since.  Moreover, for the past ten years, government R&D spending has been 
allocated in the same proportions among these 14 priority areas.  Scientists 
determine areas of research interest based on their scientific interests.  This bears 
only an accidental relationship, at best, to the needs of the economy in general or 
individual enterprises in particular.  This system is basically a social safety net for 
scientists.  But what began as a coping mechanism to keep the old R&D system 
intact at a time of wrenching economic change has become an obstacle to 
progress.  
•  As is well known in Latvia, there is very little private spending for R&D.  Indeed, 
Latvia ranks below all NMS’s in terms of the proportion of total R&D spending 
financed by the private sector.  At the same time, Government R&D spending is 
not designed either to catalyze private R&D spending or to allocate public 











                                                                                                                                                 
budget of £219.2 million.  For details see, Colin Alexander, “Technology Transfer: The University of 
Oxford Model,” Presentation to the NATO Advanced Training Course, Moscow, September 30, 2003.   47
Table 11 Private Sector Participation in R&D in 2001 




US 68.3%  74.4% 
Denmark 63.4%  62.5% 
Finland 70.8%  66.0% 
Ireland 66.0%




2  58.3% 
Czech Rep. 52.5%  60.2% 




Poland 30.8% 35.8% 
Slovakia 56.1%  67.3% 
Estonia 24.3%  23% 
Lithuania 12.1%  21.5% 
Bulgaria 21.6%
1  22.6% 
Latvia  15,7% 40% 
Romania 74.4%
2  61.2% 
1 in 2000 
2 in 1999 
Source : OECD, 2002 ; Eurostat 2003 
 
•  The existing R&D system has been successful in competing for grants under the 
5
th Framework program and expects to be successful in the 6
th Framework as well.  
But this is primarily contract research, led by industries and research teams from 
outside Latvia.  Not surprisingly, these R&D programs generate few scientific or 
economic spillovers to Latvian industry.   
 
One key challenge for public policy is to break this cycle of decline.  The following 
recommendations are designed to improve the efficiency of R&D spending in Latvia – to 
align it more closely with stated government priorities and to help Latvian research 
institutes foster more productive linkages with both international research institutes and, 
perhaps more importantly, with international corporations. Subsequent sections will 
discuss technology commercialization and technology upgrading of Latvian enterprises.  
Each of the  recommendations in this and the following sections should be eligible for 




The recommendations described below are presented and organized around the 
three themes:  (i) the production of knowledge; (ii) the commercialization of 
knowledge; and (iii) the absorption and diffusion of knowledge produced 
elsewhere.   
 
However, it is also possible to organize the recommendations in terms of 
priorities: what should be done first, what should be done second, and what can 
wait for later.  This organizing principle would generate the following hierarchy:   48
  Phase 1-- Structural Changes: Budget reform (1); Intellectual Property 
Rights regime (5); Technology commercialization training (6); 
Enterprise survey (10) 
  Phase 2 – Capturing the Benefits of Knowledge and Innovation: 
Millennium Science Initiative (2); Matchmaking database (4); 
Technology transfer center (7); MSTQ system (13); Skills development 
center (14)  
  Phase 3 – Integration and Consolidation:  Matching grants for foreign 
links (3); SBIR program (8); Fund of funds (9); Matching grants for local 
industry (11); Market development initiatives (15). 
 
As this hierarchy indicates, we propose focusing first on structural changes, next 
on establishing the institutional infrastructure and finally on implementing 
various matching grant schemes.  However, many activities can be developed 
and implemented in parallel.  For example, various matching grant programs can 
be discussed and studied in the context of the foresight and budget exercises 
proposed for Phase 1 and designed during Phase 2 so that they are ready for 
implementation during Phase 3. 
 
Finally, many of the recommendations can be categorized according to the 
eligible activities specified in Priority 2 of the Government’s draft proposal for 
using EU Structural funds.  This would yield the following mapping of 
recommendations to eligible activities: 
 
  Supporting linkages between companies and research institutes (3, 4)  
  Support new and existing enterprises in the area of innovation (7, 8, 9) 
  Financial support for companies with new product innovation 
capabilities in the priority areas of the economy (10, 11, 12) 
  Reconstruction
38 of sites and premises  (5, 6, 7) 
  Provision of modern equipment and infrastructure to the leading research 
institutions with commercial potential  (2) 
  Modernization and improvement of conformity assessment systems (13) 
  Marketing Development Initiative (10, 15) 
 
The draft Government proposal to the EU contains general objectives and lists of 
eligible activities.  The next step is to convert these general concepts (e.g., 
provision of modern equipment for research institutes, support for small business 
with commercialization potential) into concrete, specific programs.  The World 
Bank can help with this task.  In addition, if requested, it could help the 
Government finance a portion of its 3-year, $100 million co-financing 
commitment.   
                                                 
38   We strongly disagree with the premise that Latvia’s innovation system needs new buildings and 
premises to operate more efficiently.  Oxford Innovation, for example, started operations in an old 
industrial warehouse and moved to new premises only after it had achieved substantial success in 
commercializing technologies and incubating new high tech companies. What Latvia is missing is not 
more buildings but technology commercialization processes.  Buildings without processes will be a 
waste of money.  Thus, the policy recommendations which we have associated with this bullet point 
refer to the establishment of improved commercialization processes, not to the construction or 
refurbishment of buildings. 
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RECOMMENDATION 1.  Conduct a comprehensive review of Government R&D 
spending.  The objectives of this review would be to (i) align Government spending 
with the priorities established in Government-approved concept notes and policy 
papers; (ii) allocate government budget resources within these priorities on the basis 
of competitive grant programs; (iii) utilize scarce government resources to attract 
foreign and local private sector R&D resources; (iv) concentrate spending on a few 
key centers of excellence;
39 and (v) where appropriate, align Government spending 
with other public and private R&D resources (from the EU, NATO, and elsewhere) 
available in Latvia.   
 
As discussed in the previous section, Government R&D spending is currently scattered 
over a wide range of research areas without clear priorities and objectives.  Thus, as part 
of a comprehensive budget review, representatives from the Government, Parliament, 
scientific research community, universities, and the business community should discuss 
and agree a mission statement that identifies limited, mutually consistent, and specific 
goals and priorities for Government R&D spending.  For example, is the goal to preserve 
existing scientific research institutions irrespective of the quality of their research?  To 
support basic research and prestige science?  To develop a limited number of “centers of 
excellence” that will focus on critical research priorities?  To support the emergence of 
new high tech/science intensive SMEs?  To help the private sector commercialize 
innovations funded with budget resources?  To help existing old economy enterprises 
restructure, modernize their plant and equipment and, in light of Latvia’s approaching 
membership in the EU, become more globally competitive?  Something else? 
 
Once new goals and priorities have been agreed, it is likely that existing R&D 
expenditure patterns will have little or no correlation with these new goals and priorities.  
Therefore, as part of the spending review, the Government and Parliament should also 
examine current R&D spending priorities on a line item by line item basis to see what 
goal or objective, if any, each item serves.  Items that do not promote the new priority 
goals and objectives should be phased out rapidly.  New items should be funded only if 
they serve one of the agreed priority objectives.  
 
Finally, in addition to reviewing the goals and objectives of Government spending, the 
spending review should also consider the issue of revising spending modalities.  For 
example, only a small fraction of total Government R&D spending is allocated on a 
competitive basis, with clear transparent rules of the game, peer review of applications, 
and a clear, definable link between goals, priorities and spending.  To address this issue, 
the spending review should establish a clear timetable for increasing the portion of the 
overall R&D budget that is allocated on a competitive basis.  This, in turn, will require 
the development of clear, transparent peer review procedures, utilizing both national and 
international experts.   
 
                                                 
39   Proposals to concentrate spending in selected centers of excellence will be discussed in greater detail 
in Recommendation 3, below.    50
Many of the following recommendations will discuss competitive grant mechanisms that 
have been utilized in a variety of countries to fulfill a wide range of diverse goals and 
objectives.
40  These programs should be evaluated on two criteria.  The first is whether 
the objectives of these foreign programs are in line with the objectives that Latvia set for 
itself in its budget review deliberations.  The second is whether the spending mechanism 
which these countries adopted are consistent with the mechanisms that Latvia wishes to 
implement.    
 
RECOMMENDATION 2.  Develop a Millennium Science Initiative (MSI) project to 
channel incremental Government R&D resources into a few Latvian centers of 
excellence.  The goal should be to provide substantial incremental funding for R&D, 
provided that these incremental resources are to high priority areas selected on the basis 
of scientific merit and for research projects within these centers selected on a competitive 
basis by a combined panel of Latvian and international experts.   
 
An MSI project can be designed in a variety of ways to meet the specific needs and 
conditions of Latvia.  The following is a brief description of recent World Bank MSI 
projects designed to show the flexibility of the MSI structure.   
 
To get the process started, a group of eminent international and Latvian scientists would 
meet in Latvia to discuss priorities.  Typically, these include areas where the country has 
a (current or prospective) comparative advantage and areas that can contribute to the 
country’s long term economic development.  Resources support long term research in 
agreed areas.  The objective is to give scientists sufficient funding for a sufficiently long 
period (five years for example) so that they can embark on a long term research project. 
Funds are also available for the purchase of equipment and to support graduate and post 
graduate students.  This, in turn, helps to attract bright students to these fields. 
 
                                                 
40      The Government of Russia has developed two highly regarded competitive grant programs that may 
also be worth reviewing.  These are the Fund for Assistance to Small Innovative Enterprises (details are 
available at www.fasie.ru ) and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (details available at www.rfbr.r 
). For example, the Russian Foundation for Basic Research sets basic research priorities corresponding to 
the government’s priority research agenda, has an open tender for proposals to define and implement 
specific research projects designed to further the priority research agenda, and funds only those projects 
that have been approved by a rigorous peer review panel of national and international experts.  Institutes 
within the Russian Academy of Sciences are eligible to compete for funds, alongside other private and 
public research institutions, universities, and private enterprises.  The key point is that funding is allocated 
on the basis of competitive merit, rather than to selected institutions on an entitlement basis (e.g., where 
funds are allocated to every research institution that meets certain eligibility criteria such as membership in 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, irrespective of the quality, priority, and utility of their research).  In 
addition to these Russian programs, the Government of Mexico established the Fondos Sectoriales program 
whereby participating ministries define a set of priorities which need to be researched and then request 
proposals to conduct this research. The fondos that are currently operating are environment, agriculture and 
rural, marine, social development, housing, forestry, health, education, energy, communications, 
government and airports.  In addition, research for pure science is now supported by a fund explicitly 
dedicated to that task.  Details of the Fondos Sectoriales program, in Spanish only, are available at 
http://www.conacyt.mx/fondos/f_sectoriales.html .   
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MSI projects typically provide two types of grants: 
 
•  Promising groups (“nuclei”), often composed of younger investigators, are 
awarded 3-5 year grants at an annual level of $250,000 - 500,000 
•  International level groups (“institutes”) receive 5-7 year funding at an annual 
level of $1-2 million 
 
It should be emphasized that these levels are broad guidelines. The structure and 
investment levels for each MSI project are determined on the basis of that particular 
country’s circumstances. 
 
To date, four Latin American countries – Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil -- have 
initiated MSI projects.   
 
•  Chile: The project was funded with a $5 million World Bank loan and $10 
million from the Government.  The project will funded 3 institutes (at $1 
million per year for five years) and 10 nuclei (at $300,000 per year for three 
years).  The Government agreed to finance the project costs for the remaining 
years with its own resources. 
•  Venezuela:  The project was supported by a $15 million World Bank loan, of 
which $1.5 million went to the Ministry of Science for various institutional 
strengthening activities and $13.5 million was devoted to competitive grants.   
The project will support three institutes (for five years each at $1 million/year) 
and 8-12 Nuclei (for three years at $300,000 per year).  The Venezuelan 
Government designated priority areas for research support.  Therefore, the 
competition will not be open to all research areas and disciplines. 
•  Mexico:  Four Institutes were selected to receive a total of $50 million of 
support over five years. 
•  Brazil:  $50 million was set aside from an existing S&T loan to fund MSI 
activities that would support 25 high priority projects.   
 
If GOL is interested, the Bank could provide the Government with more detailed written 
information about the MSI program and the four MSI projects discussed briefly above. In 
addition, the Bank could organize a meeting between Latvian officials and Bank officials 
who manage the MSI program.  The objectives of the meeting would be to (i) answer the 
Government’s detailed questions about the MSI program;  and (ii) initiate a discussion of 
such detailed design issues as eligibility criteria, review procedures, project 
administration, etc.   
 
RECOMMENDATION 3.  Develop matching grant programs to help Latvian 
research institutes and private enterprises develop contract research arrangements 
and technology commercialization partnerships with foreign companies.  If modified 
for use in Latvia, these grant programs can be modeled after similar programs that have 
worked successfully in other countries.  Under the terms of these programs, the foreign 
participant would generally be expected to fund all of its own expenses.  Grant proceeds 
would be used to defray the costs of the Latvian institution’s participation in the joint   52
work program.  In designing these programs, special care will be needed to develop clear, 
transparent eligibility criteria and systems to ensure accountability for the use of funds.  
In addition, an expert panel, composed of impartial Latvian and foreign experts, should 
be established to review and approve grant applications.  The existing programs that will 
be cited below have already devised publicly available guidelines, eligibility criteria, 
application procedures, review procedures, audit procedures, standardized legal 
documents, and IPR protection procedures.  These can be reviewed an modified for use in 
Latvia.   
 
As the FIAS report notes, Latvian firms with foreign customers or some sort of foreign 
partnership are more likely to innovate and invest than firms without these links.  Having 
a demanding customer or strategic partner is an important asset – it can be a source of 
finance, a window to the world of cutting edge technology, a source of product 
certification, a link to global markets and global market intelligence, and a potential 
source of investment.  Consequently, financing a portion of the initial cost of establishing 
these links may be an important public policy objective that can help to achieve Latvia’s 
goals of technology commercialization, technology acquisition, and export 
diversification.   
 
Unfortunately, many of Latvia’s research institutes, universities and even some high tech 
enterprises have been operating largely in a “commercial vacuum.” They need help in 
establishing partnerships and obtaining contracts for outsourced corporate R&D and new 
product development.  International experience suggests that as trust is built up, 
successful delivery of outsourced R&D not only produces immediate income but can also 
lead to stronger relationships such as joint-ventures, spin-off companies, the 
establishment of local R&D centers, engineering centers or production facilities.   
Consequently, as a first step Latvian officials should view contract research with foreign 
private firms as part of a long process that could eventually lead to deeper and more 
rewarding partnerships.    
 
Unfortunately, Latvia is not yet “on the map” as a desirable location for many companies 
looking for sources of contract research.  Nor do they think of Latvia as a potential source 
of commercially viable technologies.  Latvia needs to improve its image in this respect.  
These matching grant programs, therefore, should be seen as an investment in marketing 
Latvian technological capabilities to the world and helping foreign firms answer the 
question, “why should I conduct research in Latvia.”  These grant programs might also   53




Several grant programs are worth investigating in more detail.  They include: 
 
•  The Civilian Research and Defense Foundation’s (CRDF) First Steps to Market 
Program.
 42  This grant program funds R&D projects that promote the initial 
development of working relationships between a foreign partner and eligible FSU 
research institutes.  The maximum duration of the grant is one year; the maximum 
grant size is $60,000.   
•  The CRDF Next Steps to Market Program.  This grant program funds advanced 
R&D projects with a maximum duration of two years.  These grants require a cost 
share from the foreign company to ensure that the company is committed to the 
project and to establishing a long-term partnership with the FSU researchers 
involved. For projects up to $150,000, the foreign company’s cash contribution 
must be at least 20 percent of the total FSU budget.  For projects exceeding 
$150,000, the U.S. Company’s cash contribution must be at least 20 percent of  
the first $150,000 of the total FSU budget plus 50 percent of the amount over 
$150,000.   
•  The CRDF Travel Grants Program (TGP) provides short-term travel support to 
individual scientists, engineers, and managers for travel to the United States to 
meet with U.S. for-profit companies with the intent of developing collaborative 
projects and new business opportunities. The grant pays for airfare, lodging 
expenses, per diem, and medical insurance. Travel must be to visit U.S. for-profit 
companies or U.S. commercially-oriented scientific meetings, in which U.S. for-
profit companies are identified for discussion.  The maximum award is $3,600.  
This amount includes airfare. 
•  The US Department of Energy’s Initiative for Proliferation Prevention Program 
(IPP).
43  This program promotes joint R&D projects as well as commercial 
                                                 
41   The implicit assumption behind this recommendation is that local research institutes are ready for 
contract research and collaboration with foreign researchers.  The results of the V
th Framework 
Programme give some reason for optimism in this regard.  But this hypothesis requires a more 
definitive test.  This can only be achieved by establishing grant programs to encourage collaboration 
and contract research and to then seeing what happens.  If collaboration and contract research 
relationships are not established, it will be clear that Latvian research institutes are not interesting 
partners for foreign firms and institutes.  But if that is the case, few if any grants will have been issued 
and the program will not cost the government any money.  Seen from this vantage point, establishing 
grant programs is a relatively inexpensive way to test the market’s interest in Latvian R&D capacity.  
 
42   Additional materials about the First Steps to Market Program and Next Steps to Market Program 
including detailed eligibility requirements and application forms are available at the Industry Programs 
portion of the CRDF web site – www.crdf.org . CRDF programs are explicitly designed to help 
researchers in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan establish partnerships with US companies.  Unfortunately, CRDF 
programs do not operate in Latvia.    
 
43    Information about the IPP program, including copies of all relevant program documents, can be found 
at http://www.usic.net/usic/test1.nsf/Links/The+Program . 
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technology development projects involving industry partners from the U.S.  The 
joint R&D program is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of an NIS 
technology, thereby establishing working contacts and evaluating the scientific 
and engineering capabilities of the NIS Institute. Commercial technology 
development projects are designed to market a product, process or service based 
on an NIS Institute technology.  
•  The Israel-US Binational Research and Development Foundation (BIRD) was 
established and is supported by both government.
44  The Foundation provides 
both matchmaking services between U.S. and Israeli companies, as well as 
funding covering up to 50 percent of project development and product 
commercialization costs.  Any pair of companies, one Israeli and one U.S.-based, 
may apply jointly so long as they can demonstrate the combined capabilities and 
infrastructure to define, develop, manufacture, sell and support an innovative 
product based on industrial R&D. The companies may be simply cooperating on 
an ad hoc basis, linked through a corporate joint venture, or commonly owned (in 
whole or in part).  The actual method by which the support is provided is quite 
straightforward - BIRD cost-shares 50:50 with each Israeli-U.S. partner.  Grants 
from the Foundation are repaid via royalties from sales of the new product or 
technology supported by the Foundation.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 4.  Facilitate matchmaking services with foreign 
laboratories and enterprises: Latvia should establish one centralized network where 
potential foreign partners can go to find R&D capabilities and industrial partners.  
In India, for example, the Council of Scientific & Industrial Research, (CSIR or Brain 
Bank) links 40 government research institutes and provides a comprehensive directory 
listing scientists by area of expertise.
45 In addition to maintaining a centralized database, 
the database managers should make a proactive effort to bring these research capabilities 
to the attention of venture capital firms in the US, Europe and elsewhere.  The purpose of 
this outreach effort would not be to encourage venture capital firms to invest in Latvia, 
although that may be a secondary benefit.  Instead the objective would be to encourage 
their portfolio firms to consider Latvia as a potential source of low cost, high quality 
contract research expertise that can help solve critical technical problems.
46  Latvia 
should strive to become a source for this contract research.  Some of the matching grant 
programs mentioned in Recommendation 3 above can be used to initiate this process.  
 
                                                 
44    Information about the BIRD Foundation can be found at www.birdf.com .  Similar binational programs 
exist between Israel and the UK, South Korea, Canada and Singapore.  Website addresses for each of 
these binational programs can be found on the website of the Office of the Chief Scientist at 
http://www.moit.gov.il/tamas_level2_English.asp?sid=1434 . 
 
45   Additional information about CSIR can be found at www.csir.res.in .  Another interesting model worth 
considering is the United Nations sponsored Asia and Pacific Centre for Technology Transfer 
(http://www.apctt.org/). 
 
46   Contract research arrangements can graduate over time to joint ventures.  These joint ventures between 
small, high tech start-ups and Latvian research partners may become interesting candidates for venture 
capital financing.     55
B. Technology  Commercialization 
 
The Latvian Technology Commercialization system is poorly developed.  Indeed, it is 
fair to say that it is close to non-existent compared to systems in most EU countries, the 
US, or even what is being contemplated in Russia.  Not surprisingly, as the charts below 
indicate, Latvia is near the bottom of all NMS’s in terms of the per capita volume of 
domestic and foreign patents issued to residents.  This poor showing is not surprising.  
Why should Latvian enterprises go to the expense and bother of registering ownership of 
something that will not be commercialized and, therefore, will not generate revenues.   
 
Figure 30 A EPO patent applications (per million population) 













Source: Trendchart, 2003, www.trendchart.org  
 
 
Similarly, data from the Latvian patent office suggests that foreign firms also do very 
little patenting in Latvia.  What little foreign patenting does occur is typically of a 
defensive nature – e.g., foreign pharmaceutical companies patenting drugs to ensure that 
Latvian firms do not begin producing generics or foreign consumer goods companies 
trying to protect themselves against locally-produced  counterfeits.  Foreign firms obtain 
almost no high tech patents in Latvia.  This suggests that there is almost no concern that 
Latvian firms would even know how to use this knowledge for their commercial benefit.  
In this market, Latvia is more or less an afterthought.  
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Source: U.S. Patent Office, 2003, http://www.uspto.gov/  
 
 
The following recommendations are designed to enhance the technology 
commercialization system in Latvia: 
 
RECOMMENDATION 5.  Prepare a clear government policy statement regarding 
the ownership of intellectual property (IP) funded in whole or in part with Latvian 
Government budget resources. Establish a fund to help defray the cost of patenting 
Latvian inventions in the EU, the US and Asia.  Some of the cost could be recouped 
by a small royalty payment to the patent fund when those foreign patents generate 
royalty or licensing income.   
The Latvian patent law should be revised to state unambiguously that IP funded in whole 
or in part with budget resources will belong to the institute, university or enterprise where 
it was created provided that the recipient of the IP makes a good faith effort to 
commercialize it.  By making this change, GOL would ensure that its patent law is in line 
with prevailing patterns in the EU and the US and even now in Russia.  Annex 2 contains 
a detailed discussion of the US approach to this issue.
47  Although Latvian patent law 
does not prohibit institute, enterprise or university ownership of this IP, it would be a 
good advertisement to make an explicit statement that the government will not attempt to 
claim ownership or put other impediments in the way of technology commercialization.   
 
                                                 
47   For a review of OECD policies related to patenting and licensing at public research organizations see, 
Turning Science Into Business: Patenting and Licensing at Public Research Organizations, OECD, 
2003, especially Chapter 1.  In virtually every country, the Government has relinquished ownership of 
the intellectual property generated in public research organizations. Also see, OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook, OECD, 2002, especially, Chapter 6. 
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Murky ownership status hampers technology commercialization, deters foreign 
investment and, in fact, could potentially leave Latvia’s IP resources open to 
unauthorized duplication in the West and elsewhere.  Moreover, matching grant 
programs, SBIR, or other programs designed to bridge the innovation gap and catalyze 
private research funding cannot succeed as long as the ownership of the IP generated by 
these collaborative arrangements remains in doubt.  Thus, clarifying IP ownership is not 
only essential to improve the quality of government R&D spending.  It is also essential to 
facilitate more productive linkages between SMEs and larger domestic and foreign 
enterprises, attract venture capital, commercialize Latvia’s existing stock and new flow of 
innovations, and generally facilitate Latvia’s transition to a more productive position in 
the global knowledge economy.  The OECD experience suggests that transferring 
ownership of government-funded IP to the research institute or university where the 
innovation was created is the most effective way to eliminate these ambiguities and 
uncertainties and generate successful government-industry R&D collaboration and IP 
commercialization programs.   
 
Four critical factors determine the success of these OECD collaboration and 
commercialization programs.  The first is the replacement of uncertainty with clarity in 
terms of actual ownership.  The second is the establishment of clear commercialization 
rules of the game – e.g., who is responsible for commercialization?  How are the financial 
returns of technology commercialization divided between the inventor, the organization 
bearing the financial risk of commercialization, the owner of the IP, and the Government, 
if it is not the owner?  The third is the establishment of effective organizational 
arrangements to manage and implement the commercialization process, starting with the 
filing of domestic and international patent applications and ending with the collection and 
distribution of royalties generated by successfully commercialized innovations.  And the 
fourth and final is the development of clear mechanisms to promote the growth of new, 
science intensive SMEs and to ensure that innovations are used to improve the global 
competitiveness of domestic enterprises in general.   
 
For example, the US Government operates a large number of government funded defense 
and civilian research programs, maintains a large number  of government owned 
laboratories and federal research facilities, and is generally recognized to have one of the 
most successful IP commercialization programs in terms of clarifying ownership, 
converting inventions into products and industrial processes, and developing new, 
dynamic SMEs.  These programs rest on two critical pillars.  The first is the recognition 
that the Government was not and could never be an effective owner of IP.  Therefore, the 
US Government transferred ownership of government funded IP to the university or 
institute where it was created.  The second pillar was the development of rules and 
regulations specifying the university or research institute’s rights and responsibilities for 
commercializing the government-funded IP and the establishment of institutions 
dedicated to technology commercialization at institutes and universities.   
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.  Organize a technology commercialization training 
program to raise consciousness and increase know-how.  A detailed understanding of 
technology commercialization  processes, procedures, and practices seems to be in short   58
supply in Latvian enterprises, universities, and research institutes.  However, over the 
past few years, numerous technology commercialization training programs have been 
organized in various transition countries.  Annex 3 contains the course outline for one 
such program organized by the US Department of Energy for scientists in the Nizhny 
Novgorod region of Russia.  These courses typically cover such issues as (i) protection of 
intellectual property rights; (ii) issues to consider in looking for strategic partners or 
venture capital investments; (iii) what strategic partners and venture investors want to see 
when they evaluate potential deals; (iv) case studies illustrating important lessons of 
experience – e.g., the so-called do’s and dont’s of technology commercialization; and (v) 
recent trends in global technology markets.  Latvian officials should invite training 
organizations and EU or US government agencies to organize similar training programs 
in Latvia.   
 
In addition to the course discussed above, Latvia might also benefit from the recent 
NATO training course on Technology Management and Intellectual Property Rights.
48  
That course, which was designed for Russian participants, discussed the French, German, 
Japanese, US and UK technology commercialization models.  It also discussed a variety 
of royalty sharing and intellectual property right issues that must be addressed in the 
context of establishing technology commercialization systems.  Furthermore, if Latvian 
officials would be interested and if funding could be arranged, a series of seminars and 
guest lectures could be organized in Latvia to discuss such topics as (i) the experience of 
establishing the Austin Technology Incubator (or successful incubators in other countries 
such as Oxford Innovation in the UK or Sophie Antipolis in France); (ii) the role and 
functions of the US-based Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) and 
the way in which university-based technology transfer offices commercialize innovations 
created in US universities; (iii) a first-hand account of the challenges facing Russian 
scientists who wanted to commercialize their innovations and present them at technology 
trade flows in the US, Europe, and Asia; and (iv) a description of the work required to set 
up a technology commercialization system at the Russian Academy of Science Institute 
of Physical Chemistry in Chernogolovka.   
 
RECOMMENDATION 7.  Establish at least one Technology Transfer Center 
(TTC) in Latvia.  Experience from countries as diverse as US, Israel, and Finland 
indicates that new financial instruments are worthless unless they are complemented by a 
supportive commercialization infrastructure, one that can generate the deal flow 
demanded by investors and which would be energized and motivated to succeed by a 
proper set of incentives.
49   
 
To be successful and effective, this commercialization infrastructure must provide a wide 
range of complementary commercialization services.  In addition, the critical elements 
                                                 
48   The training course program along with the text of various presentations is available at 
www.ipr.inage.ru/nato . 
 
49   This recommendation is predicated on the assumption that Latvian research institutes have a pipeline 
of commercially viable inventions and innovations that that could be commercialized if the proper 
incentives and commercialization systems were in place.  It is important to emphasize that this is an 
unverified hypothesis.  Indeed, the purpose of establishing a TTC is test the validity of this hypothesis.   59
should work as a unified whole, not as isolated, independent institutions.  Unfortunately, 
Latvia has not yet developed an efficient, effective commercialization system.  If we 
think of the technology commercialization process as a large pipeline with basic research 
as a critical input at one end of the pipeline and new products, businesses, joint ventures 
and collaborative partnerships at the other end of the pipeline, then several critical 
segments are missing from the Latvian pipeline and others are operating poorly and 
inefficiently.   
 
A TTC should provide the following services:  
 
(i)  conduct technology audits to identify what locally available technologies, 
scientific developments and innovations developed in local universities 
and research institutes have the greatest prospect for commercial success 
(See Annex 4 for a brief description of technology audits and a technology 
audit questionnaire that was utilized recently to identify potentially 
commercially viable technologies developed by the Institute of Physical 
Chemistry in Chernogolovka, near Moscow.);  
(ii)  operate a technology transfer office that would perform the following 
range of functions on behalf of the local scientists, institutes and 
educational institutions: apply for domestic and foreign patents, pay the 
necessary patent application and annual patent maintenance fees, license 
the patented IP, enforce ownership rights against alleged infringement, 
collect royalties from license holders, and distribute royalties according to 
a pre-determined formula between the TCA/TTO (to cover administrative 
expenses), the institute our university where the IP was invented, and the 
inventor(s) (See Annex 5 for a more detailed discussion of TTOs and 
Annex 6 for the rules and regulations governing the Texas A&M TTO);  
(iii)  establish incubators that would operate like those in Israel.  The purpose 
of these incubators would be to nurture new, high tech companies during 
the first year or two of their existence so that they can attract venture 
capital support and succeed on their own. (See Annex 7 for a brief 
discussion of incubators);  
(iv) develop  a  commercialization strategy – licensing, joint venture, strategic 
partnership, etc. -- for each of the firms in the incubator and help to 
connect these local high tech entrepreneurs and scientists with potential 
customers, strategic partners, joint venture partners and venture capitalists; 
and  
(v)  market the identified technologies at international fairs, help make 
presentations to venture capitalists, help to establish linkages between 
local research institutes and private companies/international research 
institutes operating in similar fields, etc. 
 
To support this initiative, the Government could finance a portion of the TTC’s initial 
start up and operating costs.  The TTC would operate on the basis of the following 
principles: 
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•  The TTC would strive to provide the establish the full support chain for the 
establishment of new, technology based firms (NTBF’s) and the 
commercialization of technology.  In other words, and following up on the initial 
pipeline analogy, a pipeline is useless if even small pieces are missing.   
Everything must be in place if anything is to function.  This is as true for pipelines 
as for support programs for TTC’s. 
•  The TTC should be a privately managed public-private partnership.
50  The private 
managers should have extensive international experience in technology 
commercialization and incubation.  Key stakeholders in each TTA would be the 
Latvian Government, participating universities or research institutes, foreign or 
domestic enterprises that may have a demand for locally produced technology, 
and private financial organizations. 
•  Ideally, the TTCs should be self supporting after 3-5 years.  As in Israel and other 
western incubator/technology commercialization models, the incubator or TTC 
would receive success fees and minority equity stakes in deals and enterprises 
brokered or supported by the TTC.  However, public funding in the range of $7 
million to $10 million would be required for the initial years of operation.  This 
public support would be provided on a declining basis and would finance the 
following activities:  (i) a portion of the initial start up costs and first few years of 
operating costs – primarily expert personnel and TA; (ii) a portion of the cost of 
conducting expert technology audits at the selected institutes and universities.   
The purpose of these audits would be to ascertain what technologies and 
innovations, if any, have potential commercial application; (iii) a portion of the 
cost of applying for and maintaining foreign patents.  Not every innovation 
identified by the audit will be eligible for patent protection or worth the cost of 
patent protection. Therefore, the Government should establish some sort of 
transparent, competitive, expert evaluation system for selecting which innovations 
would be eligible to receive foreign patent protection grants: (iv) training local 
personnel in the legal, financial and technical aspects of establishing and 
operating a TTO.  Training could include such topics as case studies on how 
TTOs operate in different countries, the mechanics of conducting a technology 
audit, how to market innovations and search for licensees, different strategies for 
managing IP, and different strategies for linking the TTO to the institute’s 
overarching research and innovation mission.     
•  The TTC would engage in the following activities: (i) during each year of 
operation, conduct a technology audit to identify the most promising commercial 
opportunities available in the target research and educational institutions; (ii) 
                                                 
50 Some countries and universities have outsourced these activities to specialized private firms established 
exclusively for this purpose.  For examples of two such firms see the web site of the British 
Technology Group at www.btg.com  and the website of the Zernike Group at www.zernikegroup.com .  
BTG was a U.K. governmental body (under a different name) which managed the commercialization 
of the British government’s stock of IP generated from universities and research institutes and was 
eventually spun-off during the Thatcher privatization years.  They subsequently had an IPO to pay 
back a large portion of the debt owed to the government.  Today it is traded on the London Stock 
Exchange and is a global leader in commercializing technologies acquired from firms, universities and 
research institutes.   
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develop a commercialization strategy – licensing, joint venture, strategic 
partnership, establish a new SME to exploit the technology etc. -- for each of the 
most promising technologies identified during each audit; (iii) develop a 
catalogue of available technologies; (iv) market the identified technologies at 
international fairs, help make presentations to venture capitalists, help to establish 
linkages between local research institutes and private companies/international 
research institutes operating in similar fields, etc.; (v) establish and operate an 
incubator that would provide direct support to start-ups, including training, legal, 
technical, IPR, and financial services; (vi) conduct technology commercialization 
and entrepreneurship courses; (vii) help start ups make contact with international 
networks of venture capitalists, other high tech firms, etc.  In other words, ensure 
that Latvian technologies and NTBFs end their isolation and become fully 
integrated participants in the scientific/high-tech global division of labor.   
 
RECOMMENDATION 8.  Establish a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
program modeled after the US Government’s Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program or similar grant programs operating in Israel and Finland.  In 
general, each of these programs provide pre-commercialization funding so that 
scientist/entrepreneurs can test  the commercial and technical feasibility of research ideas 
emerging from the laboratory.   
 
International experience shows that venture capitalists and other private financiers will 
typically not finance a company until the commercial and technical feasibility has been 
established, at least to a minimum rudimentary extent.  Funds to demonstrate technical 
and commercial feasibility are typically the critical missing link in the commercialization 
chain.  As a recent OECD report declared, “Academic scientists generally have no 
resources, no stimuli to continue research beyond the point at which it is reasonable to 
expect publication in a scientific journal.  [Point A in the Diagram below.] Industry finds 
this point in the research process still fraught with risks, for the knowledge available at 
this moment is still very remote from being able to be assessed in market terms, i.e., to be 
able to calculate any rate of return on the probable investments.  [Point B in the Diagram 
below.]  Bridging this gap, the so-called ‘innovation barrier,’ should be a primary 
objective of Government R&D spending.”
51  Although this quote is about Russia, it 
pertains to Latvia as well. 
 
The US Government’s SBIR program provides grants for the explicit purpose of bridging 
this innovation gap.  The SBIR program serves several valuable functions in the US: (i) it 
supports technology commercialization, (ii) it promotes the development of high tech 
SMEs, (iii) it helps to create a flow of potentially bankable deals for venture capitalists;  
and (iv) it perhaps most importantly, it encourages enterprises to conduct government-
                                                 
51   Baruch Raz, “National Frameworks for Encouraging Cooperation Between Science and Industry: The 
Case of Israel,” Paper presented at the at the Helsinki Seminar on “Innovation Policy And The 
Valorisation Of Science And Technology In Russia,” March 1 –2, 2001 available at the web site 
address http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/ 
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funded R&D.  This has several important advantages.  First, it encourages enterprises to 
start conducting more research.  As the innovation survey shows, most Latvian 
enterprises are not particularly active in this regard. This program can help alter the status 
quo.  Second, it encourages enterprises to find commercial outlets for the government-
funded research which they conduct.  This, in turn, will help to stimulate high tech start-
ups and spin-offs.  In the US, the government organizes special seminars to teach firms 
how to apply for SBIR grants.  A similar training program would not only help Latvian 
enterprises apply for a Latvian SBIR program but it could also be tailored to help them 
apply for various EU programs as well.  
 
If the government is interested, the World Bank could ask the US National Science 
Foundation (NSF) to help design this component.  (See Annex 8 for further details of the 
SBIR program.)  
 
































RECOMMENDATION 9.  Establish a fund of funds, similar to Yozma in Israel, 
Sitra in Finland, or SBIC in the US to help attract venture capital to Latvia.
52  While 
                                                 
52   For details of Sitra’s activities, see http://www.sitra.fi/eng/index.asp?MM=1&DirID=62 .  Yozma’s 
venture capital activities are described in http://www.yozma.com/home/ .  For a general overview of 
the venture capital industry see, Martin Kenney, Kyonghee Han, and Shoko Tanaka. “Venture Capital 
Industries in East Asia,” Report prepared for the World Bank, 2003.    Also note that the Netherlands 
established a matching grant program for seed capital investments in the biotech sector.  Details of this 
program are available at www.biopartner.nl . This Dutch program is administered for the Government 
by the Zernike Group whose website address is given in footnote 13 above.  Many US states 
established similar matching grant programs.  One interesting program is organized by the State of 
Maryland. Details of the Maryland Venture Capital Trust can be found at 
http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/mdmanual/25ind/html/76vent.html .  In addition to the Yozma 
Fund, Israel recently established a Seed Fund whereby the government matches investments in a start-  63
acknowledging Latvia’s impressive technological achievements, potential investors still 
complain about a shortage of “bankable deals” and lament the fact that there is no 
organized, coherent commercialization system to boost the flow of deals coming to their 
attention.  The previous recommendations are all designed, in effect, to increase the flow 
of bankable deals that could be financed by private venture capital funds.   
 
But experience in a wide range of countries including Israel, Finland the US, Turkey and 
Mexico, among others suggests that modest government support may be required to 
catalyze the emergence of a private venture capital industry.  Therefore, as the last step in 
a broader technology commercialization program, the Government may also wish to 
establish a so-called Fund of Funds (FOF) that would provide a portion of the investment 
funds required by new venture capital funds operating in Latvia.   
 
An FOF could operate on a variety of financial principles.  The precise operating 
procedures of a Latvian FOF should be decided following further analysis of the Latvian 
market conditions.  Therefore, the following description and discussion of options should 
be viewed as illustrative, rather than as a concrete, specific recommendation.  
 
The ratio of FOF support to private support might be in the range of 1 : 2 – e.g., FOF 
would provide $1 of support for every $2 raised by private investors – or slightly greater, 
depending on market conditions and demands from investors.  However, in all cases, the 
FOF would provide a minority of the total funding.  One approach would be for the FOF 
to  provide its financial support on the same commercial terms as the other private 
investors investing in a particular venture capital fund and would share all losses and 
profits with those private investors on a pro rata basis.  In a second variant, the FOF 
provides its financing on more favorable terms.  In this latter approach, the FOF would 
bear the first loss up to a set amount, or allow private investors to recoup a portion of 
their initial investment before the FOF receives any returns.   
 
This FOF program would have several advantages and safeguards against political 
interference in decision making as well as provisions to shield the Government against 
excessive financial exposure to individual companies.  For example: 
 
•  No FOF resources would be disbursed to a private venture capital fund unless 
private investors finance their agreed share of the venture capital fund. 
Consequently, Government funds would be disbursed only alongside private 
funds.  
•  Any private venture capital fund that meets the published eligibility criteria would 
be eligible for FOF funding.  This is designed to eliminate any potential claims of 
favoritism or discrimination.    
                                                                                                                                                 
up company made by a private investing entity. The Government’s investment in the start-up company 
is repaid by royalties on sales or alternatively, the investor can purchase the government shares in the 
start up company within five years at the initial price plus interest.  Details of this fund for start up 
companies is available at  www.moit.gov.il/heznek.htm .  
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•  Private investors would always have a controlling share of each VC fund.  
•  Decisions about investments in individual high tech companies will be made by 
professional private sector managers working for the newly established private 
venture capital funds.   
 
 
C.  Absorption and Diffusion of Knowledge 
 
As noted in previous sections, Latvia produces much less than 1% of the world’s 
knowledge.  This proportion will not increase significantly, even if Latvia develops the 
world’s most efficient knowledge production and technology commercialization systems.  
For the foreseeable future, therefore, Latvia will have no choice but to acquire most of its 
knowledge from outside Latvia.  Latvian enterprises will simply be unable to compete 
without an efficient knowledge absorption and knowledge diffusion capability.   
Unfortunately, this capability currently does not exist in Latvia.  Even on the basis of the 
crudest measure of technology absorption – knowledge licensed from abroad -- Latvia 
ranks near the bottom of the NMS’s.   
 
However, acquiring knowledge is not simply a question of going out and purchasing it 
from outside vendors.  Firms need to have the capacity to search for different 
technologies, to evaluate different technological options, to modify off-the-shelf 
technologies for use by a particular enterprise and, last but by no means to least, to 
integrate new technologies into their production processes.  These are not simple or easy 
tasks.  They require a great deal of organizational, managerial, and technological 
sophistication.   Simply put, enterprises need to acquire the skills which they need to 
acquire and use technology.   
 
Recent studies suggest that business enterprises constitute both the “demand side” and the 
“supply side” of industrial technology.  In other words, the business sector produces most 
of the technology that is required by the business sector.  The technology doesn’t come 
from fundamental or even applied research generated by R&D laboratories.  Rather, it is 
generated by design and engineering activities spawned by interaction with customers, 
suppliers, and competitors.  This helps to explain why clusters, competition, and linkages 
with other firms are so important to the technology development process.  This also 
suggests that Latvia has a dual problem.  On the one hand, most of the scientific research 
capacity is concentrated in public research institutes and universities rather than in 
enterprises.  And on the other hand, Latvian industry is ill equipped and ill disposed to 
pursue technology development.   
   
Breaking this vicious circle requires a two-pronged attack, as experience from industrial 
countries and east Asia suggests.  First, enterprises have to strengthen their technological 
learning and innovation capabilities.  And second, R&D and educational institutions need 
to focus more of their efforts and attention to the needs of enterprises so that they can 
support enterprise innovation.  The following policy recommendations are designed to 
help Latvia (i) assess and improve enterprise innovation capacity and (ii) improve linkage 
between R&D and educational institutes on the one hand and enterprises on the other.   65
 
Evaluating Enterprise Innovation Capability. A recent World Bank study describing how 
firms innovate and use knowledge evaluates and ranks enterprises on the basis of nine 
key dimensions of technological capability.
53 These variables encompass such factors as 
a firm’s ability to develop a coherent technology strategy to support the business, acquire 
and absorb technologies, form and exploit linkages with networks of suppliers and 
collaborators, plus several other critical core competencies.   
 

















             Source:  How Korean Firms Use Knowledge, World Bank processed, 2002. 
 
Firms are then placed in one of four categories based on (i) the degree to which a 
firms is aware of the overall need to change and (ii) the degree to which 
management is aware of what to change and how to go about changing it.
54   
 
                                                 
53 World Bank, Korea: How Firms Use Knowledge, Part A: Firm Level Innovations in the Korean 
Economy, 2002. 
54  This discussion is from Korea: How Firms Use Knowledge,  Part A – Firm Level Innovation in the 
Korean Economy, World Bank processed, 2002 and Erik Arnold, Martin Bell, John Bessant and Peter 
Brimble,  Enhancing Policy and Institutional Support for Industrial Technology Development in 
Thailand: The Overall Policy Framework and the Development of the Industrial Innovation System, 
World Bank processed, 2000. 
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Figure 34 Groups of Firms According to Technological Capability 
  High 
Low 
Awareness of the 
need to change Low  High 
Type 1 Firms
‘  Don’t know that 
they don’t know’
Type 2 Firms
‘Know they don ’t know, 
but don’t know what’
Type 3 Firms 
‘Know what, but not 
always where and how  ’ 
Type 4 Firms 
High capability and 
absorptive capacity 
Awareness 





Source: Arnold et Al., 2000; World Bank, 2002 
 
At the lowest level are firms that have no capacity for technological change.  At the 
highest level are firms such as Intel, Boeing, Siemens and Microsoft which have the 
capacity to absorb technologies from around the world, innovate, and produce leading 
edge high tech products.  None of the leading Korean firms, for example, is in the top 
tier.  Firms such as Hyundai, LG, and Samsung are only in the third category.  They can 
produce and assemble high tech products using technology imported from abroad, but 
they cannot innovate or generate their own leading edge technologies. 
 
This analysis of firm-level technological capability suggests that Latvia’s goal of 
becoming a global innovator may be overly ambitious, at least in the immediate short run.  
Latvia has very few enterprises that can compete with a Samsung or Hyundai in the 
production of globally competitive mass produced consumer or capital goods, most 
Latvian enterprises do not have the high levels of technological capability required to 
compete with other globally competitive innovative firms, and the Latvian NIS is far 
from being in robust good health.  Addressing these issues will be critical if Latvia 
wishes to become a truly innovative economy.  
  
RECOMMENDATION 10.  Audit a representative sample of Latvian enterprises to 
assess their technological absorption and development capacity, using the tools and 
methodology developed for the Korean study.  Based on the needs identified by the 
survey, develop specific policies, based on international lessons of experience,  to 
help Latvian enterprises at each stage in the development process to improve their 
technological capabilities and attain higher levels of technological sophistication.  
Researchers have developed a fairly simple audit tool to assess the technical capability of   67
enterprises.  Latvian policy makers should utilize this audit tool to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of a large representative sample of Latvian enterprises.  Based on the 
weaknesses revealed by the audit and international lessons of experience, they should 
develop specific targeted strategies that would help enterprises improve in areas where 
they are deficient and achieve higher levels of sophistication.   
 
RECOMMENDATION 11.  Develop matching grant programs to align government 
R&D spending more closely to the innovation and competitiveness needs of domestic 
industry.  At present, Government R&D spending priorities bear little relationship 
to the innovation or competitiveness needs of Latvian enterprises.  Nor are 
Government  R&D spending programs designed to catalyze private innovation 
spending.  To a certain extent, this is a classic chicken and egg dilemma. As the 
preceding discussion of the Latvian innovation survey indicated, Latvian enterprises 
are not particularly prone to innovate and, when they do, R&D is not the favored 
mode of innovation.  Not surprisingly, therefore, Government R&D spending 
priorities have not responded to the low or non-existent demand from industry for 
more targeted R&D spending.  At the same time, it is also important to recognize 
that more targeted Government R&D spending, by itself, will not be sufficient to 
stimulate greater enterprise spending on or interest in innovation.  Targeted 
programs, in other words, are not a panacea or magic bullet.  Nevertheless, if 
coupled with other complementary policies and programs, World Bank projects in 
India, Turkey, and Chile among others, suggest that carefully crafted matching 
grant programs can be one part of a comprehensive approach to stimulating greater 
private sector innovation.   
 
For example, a 1999 World Bank Industrial Technology project in Turkey
55, provided 
matching grants to co-finance up to 50% of the cost of product and process R&D among 
private enterprises.  The project places special emphasis on promoting linkages between 
the R&D institutions and Turkish industry.  A project with a similar component is 
currently under development in Croatia.  And finally, a forthcoming World Bank project 
in Chile
56 would provide grants to research consortia from universities, government 
laboratories, and private industry undertaking collaborative research and development, 
and research training, in areas of importance to industry and the regions of Chile.  The 
private industry and public sector agencies involved in the consortia and teams will be 
required to make substantial in-kind and cash commitments to support the cooperative 
activities. 
 
As part of a more comprehensive program to promote enterprise innovation in Latvia, the 
Government should consider developing similar programs. 
 
                                                 
55   For details, see the Project Appraisal Document for a project in Turkey entitled, “Industrial 
Technology Project,” Report No: 18351-TU, May 1999. 
 
56   For details, see the Project Appraisal Document for a project in Chile entitled, “Science For The 
Knowledge Economy In Support Of The First Phase Of The Program To Improve The Innovation 
System,” Report No. 25324, April 2003. 
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RECOMMENDATION 12.  Develop  Teaching Company Scheme (TCS) program 
similar to the UK’s
57 to encourage Latvian enterprises to give internships to 
graduate engineering students or research scientists.  In addition, develop a 
program to help Latvian engineers and business executives working in Latvian 
enterprises (including those working in non-high tech enterprises) spend several 
months on sabbatical working in a foreign company or research lab.  Experience 
suggests that this so-called “tacit knowledge” or know-how can be one of the most 
important factors promoting innovation in an enterprise.  
 
The TCS provides a government grant to encourage UK enterprises to hire graduate 
students, young research scientists, or young professors for up to two years to conduct a 
research or engineering project defined by the private enterprise.  Latvia should develop a 
similar scheme.  Via this program, Latvian enterprises would get the benefit of research 
expertise from young, talented Latvian scientists and engineers.  Young Latvian scientists 
and engineers, in turn, would have an opportunity both to supplement classroom learning 
with on-the-job experience and to see what research issues are of interest to industry.  
This insight could then guide their future academic research, thus creating closer links 
between the research needs of enterprises and the research outputs of university and 
scientific institute laboratories.   
 
A forthcoming World Bank project in Chile will have a component similar to the UK 
Teaching Company scheme.  This project component would “expand the stock of high-
quality research personnel in Chilean industry by awarding on a competitive basis: (i) 
scholarships to doctoral students who undertake a substantial part of their thesis work in 
industry. A staff member of the company will be an Associate Supervisor of the student 
and the company will be required to contribute to a small supplement to the scholarship; 
and (ii) partial scholarships to post-doctoral or other early career researchers who will 
undertake research in industry. These latter scholarships will be temporary and decline in 
value of time, with the company taking an increasing share of the researchers salary.”   
 
RECOMMENDATION 13.  Establish a Measurements, Standards, Testing and 
Quality (MSTQ) service.  The industrial demand for refinements in measurement 
accuracy, and for rigorous product specifications embodied in public standards continues 
to grow in all OECD countries.  Latvia’s needs are likely to increase substantially as it 
tries to move from the production and export of low-skill goods to the production and 
export of technology and skill intensive products that demand precision, quality and 
compatibility with international standards.  These requirements will place heavy demands 
on the existing MSTQ infrastructure which would, therefore, need to be expanded, 
strengthened and harmonized with EU requirements.   
 
Bank projects have addressed these issues in several countries.  Specifically, these 
projects have helped (i) upgrade existing measurement services by improving the 
efficiency with which the measurements are performed; and (ii) developed measurement 
                                                 
57    Information about the Teaching Company Scheme is available at http://www.tcsonline.org.uk/ .   
Information about a newly revised version of the program known as the Knowledge Transfer 
Partnership is available at www.ktponline.org.ul    69
services in new areas such as chemical and medical metrology. In addition to providing 
these basic services, an MSTQ program in Latvia could also ensure that Latvian MSTQ 
standards conform with analogous EU standards and provide training, advice and 
outreach services to customers so that they understand the value and importance of 
MSTQ services.  Indeed a well functioning MSTQ institution could also serve as a spur 
to incremental innovation in firms through the relationship between product testing, 
identification of technical problems, and process innovation.  
 
RECOMMENDATION 14.  Establish at least one Skills Development Center.  
Latvian business executives complain frequently and vocally about acute shortages of 
skilled technical workers.  In addition, they argue that engineering schools do not provide 
students with the useable skills demanded by today’s labor market.  These shortages and 
education deficiencies clearly hamper the growth of locally-owned businesses.  In 
addition, it is highly likely that they deter foreign investors from investing in Latvia or, if 
they are already in Latvia, from adding high skill, high wage activities to their ongoing 
Latvian operations.  When faced with similar problems, such countries as Malaysia, 
Korea and Taiwan established training institutions or skill development centers, 
specifically targeted to the needs of business and foreign investors.  A potentially useful 
model for Latvia to investigate is the Penang Skills Development Center (PSDC) in 
Malaysia.  PSDC “operates as a non-profit organization…. Participating companies pool 
their resources together to help plan, design and conduct an extensive range of training 
programs directly relevant to immediate and forecasted needs. This enables the PSDC to 
offer the most cost-effective training for the industry and at the same time bridge the gap 
between skills taught in public institutions and skills required on the job.”
58   
 
Designing a skills development center should be an immediate priority for Latvia, given 
the long lags and lead times (generally at least 2 to 3 years) involved in turning out 
qualified, educated graduates (capability lags) and the further lags before those workers 
begin to have a noticeable impact on enterprise competitiveness (economic impact lags).  
Establishing a skills development center should be done in tandem with efforts to revise 
engineering and technical training programs.  The goal should be to ensure that 
universities turn out graduates with the skills demanded by both Latvian enterprises and 
potential foreign investors. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 15.  Develop technology upgrading programs, in 
conjunction with Recommendation 10 and Recommendation 14, to assist Latvian 
enterprises.  International experience is replete with examples of successful technology 
upgrading programs.  To cite just one representative example, the Malaysian Technology 
Acquisition Fund provides grants to help local companies defray a portion of the cost of 
licensing technology and acquiring patent rights, prototypes and industrial designs.  In 
addition, the Expert Sourcing Program helps local firms engage technical experts and 
consultants to audit the manufacturing process and recommend high priority process and 
technology changes.  An industrial linkage program and a global supplier program 
                                                 
58   A brief description of the PSDC is available at    
http://www.logos-net.net/ilo/150_base/en/init/mal_5.htm .  For website links to training programs 
available in different countries see http://www.logos-net.net/ilo/150_base/en/instr/ins_top.htm .   70
provides detailed technical training to help local enterprises become competitive 
manufacturers and suppliers of parts, components and related services to multinationals 
and large domestic companies.  These programs could be especially useful now that EU 
membership is on the horizon.
59   
                                                 
59   Details of the training provided under the industrial linkage and global supplier programs are available 
at http://www.logos-net.net/ilo/150_base/en/init/mal_5.htm .  In addition, for details of the various skill 
upgrading programs available in Malaysia see  
http://www.smidec.gov.my/detailpage.jsp?section=smidecprogrammes&level=1  .  Information about 
the Technology Acquisition Fund is available at http://www.miti.gov.my/indpolicy-taf.html .   71
Annex 1  Industry Groupings: WIFO Taxonomies 
Industry groupings are differentiated by various criteria, including a combination of 
factor inputs and market strategy criteria (taxonomy 1), and labor skills (taxonomy 2), 
borrowed from the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)
60 taxonomy which 
provides a whole variety of different classifications (Peneder 1999, 2000).
61 The list of 
criteria is derived from trade and growth theories and includes labor intensity, capital 
intensity, skill intensity of workers, and technology intensity. All the distinct industry 
types are summarized in Table 12, below.  
Table 12 The WIFO taxonomies of manufacturing industry 
Taxonomy I: Factor input combinations 
• Marketing driven industries (MDI) 
• Labour intensive industries (LI)  
• Technology driven industries (TDI) 
• Capital intensive industries (CI)  
• Mainstream manufacturing (MM)  
Taxonomy II: Skill requirements 
• Low-skill industries (LS)  
• Medium-skill blue-collar industries (MBC) 
• Medium-skill white-collar industries (MWC) 
• High-skill industries (HS) 
 
 
The taxonomies were initially intended to offer a coherent set of empirical tools that 
facilitates inquiries into industrial performance with respect to the intangible sources of 
competitive advantage of European industries.  
 
Taxonomy I is based on US data for wages and salaries, investments in physical capital, 
advertising outlays and R&D expenditure. These are assumed to span four independent 
dimensions of productive inputs for revenue generation. Ratios to total value added have 
been calculated for wages and physical capital. Expenditures on advertising and R&D are 
represented by their ratio to the total sales. The latter are directly derived from balance 
sheet data.  
 
Taxonomy II is based on occupational data, distinguishing first the two types of white-
collar and blue-collar workers, and then for each, the shares of respectively high- and 
low-skilled labour. The data source stems from the OECD and covers employment shares 
for a sample of developed economies. 
 
                                                 
60   WIFO  (Österreichische Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) analyzes national and international 
economic trends and supplies short- to medium-term economic forecasts. Most of its activities include 
commissioned research and consulting for domestic and international decision-making bodies, the 
European Commission, OECD, major business and financial institutions. 
61   Peneder, M. (2000), External Services, Structural Change, and Industrial Performance, paper prepared 
for the Competitiveness Report 2000 on behalf of the European  Commission. 
Peneder, M. (1999), ‘Intangible Investment and Human Resources. The New WIFO Taxonomy of 
Manufacturing Industry’, WIFO Working Papers No. 114.     72
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Annex 2  Commercializing IP:  The US Experience 
 
Several countries have developed different models ranging from transfer of ownership of 
all government-funded IP to the private sector (US) to a system in which the state retains 
some ownership rights and actively promotes commercialization of government funded 
S&T (UK, France, Germany, Japan). Despite their differences, these systems all work 
reasonably well.  Thus, the real question is not “who owns” government funded IP but 
rather how government-funded IP can be introduced into the economic turnover.  This 
Annex will describe the US approach, in part because the US model is generally 
recognized as an example of international best practice and also because this is the 
approach which many in GOR say that they wish to emulate.  
 
The US approach to ownership and commercialization of government-funded IP is 
codified in two major pieces of legislation – the Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517) and the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act (P.L. 96-418), both approved in 1980.  Both laws are designed to 
encourage the commercialization of R&D that was funded by, or developed by the 
government.  Bayh-Dole pertains to the ownership of patents resulting from government-
funded R&D that was performed in non-government facilities – e.g., universities, non-
profit research laboratories, etc. Stevenson-Wydler pertains to the ownership of patents 
resulting from cooperative research efforts between government research laboratories and 
outside partners where there is no direct federal funding to the outside partner.
62   
 
Both laws were based on the premise that simply funding more basic research would not 
solve the US technology commercialization problem. On the contrary, technology 
commercialization is not a linear process in which more basic research inputs 
automatically generate complementary applied research, development, 
commercialization, and diffusion of the results into the economy.  The problem with the 
US in the 1980s was that despite its overall strength in basic research, other countries 
were commercializing the results.  A second related premise was that the US government 
had not been an effective owner of the IP which it had already created and funded.  At the 
time both laws were passed, the USG owned approximately 28,000 patents.  But fewer 
than 5% of these inventions were licensed for commercial use.
63  The remainder lay idle.   
 
                                                 
 
62   For details see Wendy Schacht, “Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development (R&D): 
A Discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act, (Congressional Research 
Service: The Library of Congress, December 11, 2000).  Note:  CRS reports are not generally 
available to the public although they can occasionally be found on the internet or obtained via 
Congressional offices.  CRS reports cited in this note were obtained directly from the CRS. 
 
63    U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Committees entitled 
“Technology Transfer: Administration of the Bayh-Dole Act by Research Universities, May 7, 1998. 
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The reasons for this low level of commercialization are complex.  First, and perhaps 
foremost, not every invention is commercially viable.  Markets simply do not exist for 
every interesting invention. Second, studies indicate that research accounts for 
approximately 25% of the cost of bringing a new product to market. USG agencies have 
neither the mandate nor the capability to finance the remaining 75% of the costs of 
commercializing inventions or determining which inventions have commercial potential.  
Simply stated, the government was not well suited for the venture capital business.  Last 
but not least, prior to the passage of these laws, the Government refused to relinquish title 
to federally-funded inventions.  Instead, it retained title and granted non-exclusive 
licenses to anyone who wanted to utilize the invention. Since companies could not obtain 
ownership of the patent or exclusive licenses to exploit government-funded inventions or 
inventions developed in government laboratories, they were unwilling to go through the 
expense and effort of developing new products based on these inventions.   
 
Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler were designed to clarify ownership of government 
funded IP, but more importantly, to ensure that government funded inventions were put 
into economic circulation.  They explicitly encourage cooperation between research 
institutes, universities, laboratories conducting fundamental research, and domestic 
industry to ensure that the fruits of research are not locked in the laboratory but are 
actively used as an economic resource to promote growth and the competitiveness of US 
industry.  This has proven to be especially useful for defense-oriented research.
64  Rather 
than keeping the research bottled up in defense products, Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-
Wydler protect US national security interests while simultaneously providing incentives 
for private industry to use these inventions for the widest possible range of civilian 
applications.  
 
  A. Bayh-Dole 
 
Bayh-Dole is based on a simple premise: although budget funds were financing the 
development of inventions, taxpayers were not benefiting from the economic 
development (and financial return to the government in the form of increased tax 
revenues) that would result from the successful manufacture and sale of products 
produced as a result of these inventions.  In passing Bayh-Dole, Congress decided that 
the public interest would best be served if title to budget-funded inventions were passed 
to those institutions -- universities, small businesses or non-profit research institutes – 
where the inventions were created.  But there was a caveat.  These institutions could 
retain title only if they diligently promoted commercialization by licensing the 
innovations for use by commercial enterprises.  The institutions would earn licensing fees 
and royalties (generally ranging between 3% and 6%), thereby giving them a strong 
incentive to promote commercialization.  The enterprises would receive an exclusive 
license to use the invention, thereby giving them an incentive to use corporate funds to 
                                                 
64   As one analyst observed recently, “While the major portion of total federal R&D spending has been 
in the defense arena, government-financed work has led or contributed to new commercial products 
and processes including, but not limited to, antibiotics, plastics, jet aircraft, computers, electronics, 
and genetically engineered drugs.”  Cited in Wendy Schacht, op. cit., p. 7.  
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commercialize the invention.  The USG would not share in the license fees or royalties 
(especially since universities are non-taxable institutions and therefore would not pay 
taxes on the royalties earned and were under no other obligation to share royalties with 
the government).  Nevertheless, the government would profit from the new jobs and 
increased taxes eventually generated by the increased economic activity spawned by 
government-funded inventions. As the Bayh-Dole Act declares: 
 
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to 
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally-supported 
research and development; … to promote collaboration between commercial 
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that 
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used 
in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise, to promote the 
commercialization of public availability of inventions made in the United 
States by US industry and labor; [and] to ensure that the Government obtains 
sufficient rights in federally- supported inventions to meet the needs of the 




To achieve these objective, the Bayh-Dole Act along with subsequent amendments and 
implementing regulations
66 provide for the following:  
 
•  The provisions apply to all inventions developed in the course of a federal grant, 
contract, or cooperative agreement.  The provisions apply even if the federal 
government is not the sole source of funding. 
 
•  Each university, small business or nonprofit organization (hereinafter, university) 
may retain title to inventions made as a result of government-funded R&D.
67   77
 
•  The university has an obligation to disclose each new invention to the funding agency 
within two months of its discovery. 
 
•  Within two years after disclosure, the university must decide if it wishes to retain title 
to the invention. 
 
•  If the university determines that it wishes to retain title to the invention, it must file 
for a US patent within one year.  Within ten months of the US filing, the university 
must indicate if it will file for foreign patents.  If it chooses not to, the US 
government can file for foreign patents in its own name. 
 
•  If the university retains title, it must provide the government with a non-revocable 
license to use the invention.   
 
•  Any company holding a license to a patent that involves sales of product in the US 
must substantially manufacture the product in the US unless it can be shown that this 
is not economically feasible. 
 
•  In marketing inventions to licensees, universities must give preference to small 
business firms (less than 500 employees) provided that these firms have the resources 
and capability of commercializing the invention. 
 
•  If the invention was not commercialized within a reasonable period of time, the 
federal government can compel the university to grant a license to a third party or the 
                                                                                                                                                 
65   Cited in Appendix B, “Excerpts from the Bayh-Dole Act,” in Technology Commercialization, op. 
cit. 
 
66   An excellent summary of the Bayh-Dole Act is available in “The Bayh-Dole Act:  A Guide to the 
Law and Implementing Regulations,” Council on Government Relations, September 1999, (web site: 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/bayh/html  A l s o  s e e  M a r k  W .  C r o w e l l ,  “Commercializing University 
Technology” in Technology Commercialization: Russian Challenges, American Lessons, op cit.; 
Wendy Schacht, “Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development (R&D): A Discussion 
of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Act,” (Congressional Research Service: The 
Library of Congress, December 11, 2000) and Wendy Schacht, “R&D Partnerships and Intellectual 
Property: Implications for US Policy,” (Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, 
December 6, 2000) (web site http://www.cnie.org/nle/st-19.html  .  Final rules for implementing the 
Bayh-Dole Act were published on March 18, 1987 and codified at 37 CFR part 401.1-401.16. 
According to the Council on Government Relations brochure cited above, “these 
regulations…specify the rights and obligations of all parties involved and constitute the operating 
manual for technology transfer on a national basis.” This portion of the Code of Federal Regulations 
can be accessed at the web site http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_00/37cfr401_00.html   
 
67    Bayh-Dole allows universities, small business, and nonprofit organizations to own inventions 
developed with budget funding.  However, a Presidential Memorandum issued by President Reagan 
on March 18, 1983 extended the benefit of Bayh-Dole to large for-profit organizations as well as 
small businesses.  That Memorandum is still in effect and is codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations cited above.   
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government can reclaim title and grant licenses itself.  (These are the so-called 
“march-in” rights.)  
 
•  Universities must share royalty and license income from the invention with the 
inventor.  It must use the remaining income to cover the cost of maintaining a 




Bayh-Dole had a major impact on the commercialization of government-financed 
inventions.  For example, in 1980, approximately 25-30 universities were engaged in 
technology transfer.  Between 1974 and 1984, 84 universities applied for 4105 patents 
and received 2944 patents.  Licensing income reported by 112 universities in 1986 
amounted to $30 million. By comparison, in 1999 alone, 190 universities, hospitals and 
nonprofit research organizations reported
69: 
 
•  Approximately $41 billion of economic activity, supporting 271,000 jobs was 
attributed to the results of academic licensing; 
 
•  Adjusted gross license income was $862 million; 
 
•  5545 US patent applications were filed and 3661 patents were issued; 
 
•  3914 new licenses were issued and 18,617 licenses were outstanding.  Almost 2/3 of 
the new licenses were issued to small businesses;  
 
•  The business activity associated with the sale of licensed products is estimated to 





Whereas Bayh-Dole concerns the ownership and commercialization of government-
funded inventions created in universities, Stevenson-Wydler addresses the ownership of 
inventions created in the course of cooperative research ventures between private 
enterprises and government laboratories.  The basic rationale for the legislation was an 
attempt to create closer linkages between federal laboratories conducting basic research 
                                                 
68   Excellent descriptions of university technology licensing procedures and the operation of university 
technology management offices can be found in University Technology Transfer: Questions and 
Answers, Council on Governmental Relations, November 30, 1993 (available at the web site 
http://www.cogr.edu/qa.htm .  Another excellent source of information is available at the web site of 
the Association of University Technology Managers http://www.autm.net   
 
69    1999 data are from The Association of University Technology Managers, Inc., report entitled, 
AUTM Licensing Survey, FY 1999: A Survey Summary of Technology Licensing (and Related) 
Performance for U.S. and Canadian Academic and Nonprofit Institutions and Patent Management 
Firms.  
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and private industry, on the grounds that this would generate significant benefits for both 
parties.  The basic building block of Stevenson-Wydler is the cooperative research and 
development agreement (CRADA), which defines the terms and conditions of the 
cooperative venture between a federal laboratory and private enterprise.   
 
Pursuant to Stevenson-Wydler, the work performed by a federal laboratory under a 
CRADA must be consistent with the laboratory’s basic mission.  Both parties to the 
CRADA may share personnel, services and property.  However, the federal government 
may not provide any direct funding to the private partner.  Although Wydler-Stevenson 
does not mandate any specific disposition of IP created in the course of the CRADA, it 
permits the federal laboratory to transfer ownership of the resulting IP to the private 
enterprise.  As with Bayh-Dole, the federal government must be given a non-exclusive, 
irrevocable, paid up license to use the technology throughout the world.    80





Technology Comm ercialization Training Course
Schedule
Time Day One Day Two Day Three
8:30 am -- 10:00 am
Introduction & Course Objectives
Globalization
Business Environments
Business & Research Cultures
Ideas to Products
Pathways to Comm ercialization –
  Strategic Partnering & Alliances




Technology & Product Strategies
Roadmaps for Comm ercialization
Capturing Innovation
Technology Flow into Marketplace
10:00 am – 10:30 am Break Break Break
10:30 am – 12:00 pm Pathways to Comm ercialization –
  Starting a New Company
Introduction to Intellectual
  Property






Product Comm ercialization Model
  Concept Phase
12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Lunch Lunch Lunch
1:00 pm – 3:00 pm Pathways to Comm ercialization –
  Starting a New Company
Russian Patent Law
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) –
  International Strategies
Product Comm ercialization Model
  Development Phase
  Com m ercial Phase
3:00 pm – 3:30 pm Break Break Break
3:30 pm – 5:00 pm Pathways to Comm ercialization –
  Strategic Partnering & Alliances
Business Perspectives of
  Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)
Review and Wrap-Up Discussion
5:00 pm – 5:30 pm Break Break Break
5:30 pm – 6:30 pm Role Playing Role Playing No Activity
Training Schedule M odified
                                                 
70   This three day technology commercialization course was prepared by Trykor International.  For more 
detailed information about the course, contact Timothy P. Murray, Trykor, Inc., Akademika Pilyugina 
26/1, Suite 131, Moscow 117393 Russia; Tel: 7-095-935-0985;   E:mail:  tmurray@trykor.com   81




























This is a simplified plan of the audit-driven technology commercialisation process being 
put into place at the Institute of Problems of Chemical Physics at Chernogolovka in 
Russia. Note that education (especially education in the context of real problem solving), 
team building, knowledge formation and management, underpin the whole process. 
 
                                                 
71    Material for this annex was prepared by Dr. Alistair Brett of Oxford Innovation.  The material was 
initially developed for a technology audit at the Russian Academy of Science’s Institute for Physical 
Chemistry in Chernogolovka, Russia.  Financing for the audit and other technology commercialization 
















Status of R&D globally 
Competitor information 
Market information 
Companies in the market 
License vs. joint-venture or spin-off 
decision 
Search for commercialisation partners
Education, team building, knowledge formation and 
management   82






Respondent:    
  Last  name   Name    Patronymic  name 
  Tel.:    e-mail 
 
 
1. SUBDIVISION  DATA 
 
1.1.  Basic fields of subdivision activity 
1.2.  Methods and tools being used in the subdivision that can be claimed for by 
exterior users. 
1.3.  Software support, databases, etc., worked out in the subdivision that can be 
claimed for by exterior users. 
 




2.1  Which of projects are especially perspective for commercialization? 
2.2  Which of your future researches are especially perspective? 
2.3  What sources of finance can be used by commercialization? 
2.4  Is there a direct availability of financing your researches by industrial 
enterprises? 
 
3. RESPONDENT  DATA 
 
3.1  Basic fields of your scientific interests 
3.2  Conferences, exhibitions you have taken part in (3 last years) 
3.3  List of scientific works (3 last years) 
3.4  Applications and patents where you are an author or an applicant for a 
patent (proprietor). 
3.5  List of works you have taken part in as a consultant (3 last years). Please, 
name the customer. 
3.6  Would you like to take an active part in industrial application of the project 
achievements or their commercialization? 
(or do you prefer to entrust with this task somebody else in order to concentrate yourself 
on your researchers) 
 
3.7  Would you like to be a co-founder of the company, created for a 
commercialization of your works? 
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4.  THE PROJECT THE RESPONDENT IS TAKING PART IN 
 
4.1.  COMMON  DATA ON THE PROJECT 
 
4.1.1.  Title of the project 
4.1.2.  Project director (Name, position) 
4.1.3.  Sources of finance (Customer) 
4.1.4.  Internal project participants 
 
Name Subdivision  Position  Field  of 
specialization 
     
     
     
     
 
4.1.5.  External project participants 
 
Organization Name  Position  Field  of 
specialization 
      
      
      
      
 
4.2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT 
 
4.2.1Annotation (A brief description of the project. Please, indicate the persons 
interested in the projects’ results and results specifically) 
4.2.2.  Field of project specialization 
(e.g.: petrochemistry, catalysts, etc.) 
4.2.3.  Objectives of the project 
4.2.4. Project  stage 






Fundamental prediscovery    




Production of development type/ pre-
production model 
  
Working documentation     
Organization of short-run production      84
Increase in scale of operations    
Miscellaneous    
 
4.2.5.  Degree of novelty of the work 
 
Degree of novelty    Notes 
There is no analogues     
Improved consumer characteristics of the best 
world analogues 
   
Improved consumer characteristics of the best 
domestic analogues 
   
Import substitution     
Miscellaneous     
 
 
4.2.6.  Works, carrying out in the same field of specialization . 
(Title of the work, year, authors, institution, etc.) 
 
4.2.6.1. Works-predecessors 
3-4 basic works, underlay the project. (year, authors, institution, etc.) 
 
4.2.6.2.  Please, give explanations if there is no analogues 
-  You were the first who set this problem, 
-  You had technical means to realize the task ahead of the others. 
-  Some other reasons 
 
4.2.7.  Importance of the project 
 





4.2.7.2.  Possible consequences after realization of the project 
(improvement of quality of life, decreasing of raw material and energy supply expenses, 
etc.) 
 
4.2.7.3.  What resources can be spared due to realization of the project on the 
regional, country and international levels  
(economy due to the rational utilization of resources, import substitution, etc.) 
 
 
4.3.  ENVIROMENT OF THE PROJECT 
 
4.3.1. Competitors in this field of specialization   85
4.3.1.1.What organizations and researchers are working out on the same problem in 
Russia and abroad? 
4.3.1.2.Whom of them do you keep in touch with? 
4.3.1.3.What are their results like in comparison with yours? What items have you 
taken the lead over and where are you behindhand? 
4.3.1.4.Are there any problems (on the project) you have been working out that have 
been already solved by your competitors? 
4.3.1.5.Who is universally recognized leader in this field of specialization? 
4.3.1.6.What is your evaluation of your own level in comparison with the world 
leader? 
4.3.2. Do external organizations (including state organizations) support the 
project? 





4.4.1.  What scientific results do you plan to achieve? 
4.4.2.  What practical results do you plan to achieve? 
4.4.3.  Possible trends of practical application. 
What economical spheres the project results can be used in? 
What are the concrete fields (enterprises) where the project results can be applied? 
Will the project results require licencing (inspection certification)? 
 
4.4.4  What form can your results be used in? 
Construction, device 
Technology 













4.4.6. Comparison  characteristics 
 
Technical and economic (consumers)characteristics   
Characteristic  New development work  Analogue 1  Analogue 2 
1      
2        86
3      
…      
…      
 
4.4.7.  What works and researches are necessary for obtaining results that can have 
practical application? 
Please, indicate, if it is possible, time, financing rate, organizations that are 
necessary to carry out the works. 
 
Possible consequences after industrial application of research results. 
(how does realization of the project results interact with existent technological 
processes; is essential modification of existent technological processes required?) 
 
 
4.5. INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY 









Topology of integrated circuit 
KNOW-HOW  
 










Topology of integrated circuit 
 
4.5.3.  Owner of intellectual property on the project. What are those rights based 
on? 
 
4.5.4. Publications  representing  works on the project.  
 
4.5.5.  What exhibitions, conferences with materials on the project theme have you 
taken part in?   87
 
4.5.6.  Are there any agreements on acquisition of the rights regarding the project 
results? 
 
4.5.7.  Is there financial and organizational support of exterior organizations? 
 
 
4.6.  Other projects the respondent have taken part in 
Content of the present issue corresponds to Issue 4. 
 
4.7.  Other projects carrying out in the subdivision 
Content of the present issue corresponds to Issue 4.   88
Annex 5  Technology Transfer Offices 
 
Transferring ownership of government funded IP to the university or research institute 
where it was created is a necessary, but not sufficient step toward the creation of an 
effective technology commercialization system.  To bridge the so-called “exploitation 
gap,” – i.e., the gap between the number of inventions that are created and the number 
that are actually put to commercial use -- many countries found that it was also essential 
to establish specialized institutions with trained personnel dedicated to licensing this IP to 
those foreign and domestic enterprises who will invest the time and resources required to 
develop commercially viable products based on this IP.  These specialized institutions -- 
Technology Transfer Offices (TTO)
72 as they are known in the US and Industrial Liaison 
Offices (ILO) as they are known in the United Kingdom -- generally perform the 
following range of functions: apply for domestic and foreign patents, pay the necessary 
patent application and annual patent maintenance fees, license the patented IP, enforce 
ownership rights against alleged infringement, collect royalties from license holders, and 
distribute royalties according to a pre-determined formula between the TTO (to cover 
administrative expenses), the institute our university where the IP was invented, and the 
inventor(s).
73   
 
Although TTOs are not designed to be self-supporting profit centers, US experience 
suggests that they can eventually become self sustaining within approximately 10 years.  
In most successful Technology Transfer Office, gross royalties and licensing fees 
generated by the TTO generally amount to between 0.5% and 2% of the institute’s or 






                                                 
72   For a review of several US universities’ experience with TTOs, see Raymond Smilor and Jana 
Matthews, “University Venturing:  Tech Transfer And Commercialization In Higher Education,” 
unprocessed, 2002.  
 
73   A well functioning TTO can be a tool to help attract investors to a region and establish partnerships 
between local and foreign business on the one hand and the university on the other.  In this respect, a 
TTO can be an important ingredient in a comprehensive regional development program.   
 
74      As this data suggests, the real economic value of establishing TTOs and clarifying IP ownership has 
little connection to the ensuing licensing fees.  On average, these fees are rather meager.  Rather, the 
economic value to the government and society is derived from the economic activity generated by 
the commercialization process itself.  This includes the establishment of new high tech SMEs, the 
creation of well paying, skilled jobs and the additional tax revenues generated by this additional 
economic activity.  To the extent that a concern about the distribution of royalties detracts from the 
creation of an effective IP commercialization system, the Latvian economy will lose not only 
royalties, but jobs, new businesses and taxes. 
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At Texas A&M University, the CTT is a department within the university, similar to any 
other academic or administrative department or unit within the university. Thus, CTT 
employees are employed by the Government of the State of Texas (not the National 
Government) just the same as any faculty member in the university.  All universities in 
the United States are locally administered; there are no Nationally-funded universities. 
Many of the National research agencies and research institutes, such as the National 
Science Foundation or the National Institutes of Health, have CTTs to transfer the 
agency's innovations to commercial application. These CTTs are departments in the 
national agencies and hold no independent status.  For instance, the "Office of 
Technology Transfer" or "OTT" for the National Institutes of Health, the largest 
National government research agency in the United States, is very well described on its 
website:   http://ott.od.nih.gov/     
However, there are MANY different structures for CTTs, such as: 
*       An office established within the university as a university department  
*       An external CTT, established as a "for profit" organization  
*       An external CTT, established as a "not for profit" organization  
*       A combination of both an internal office within the university, and an external 
organization, working together in a well-defined process 
*       Outsourcing technology transfer, by contracting with an external organization (a 
for-profit company, another university, or other organization) to manage all innovations 
*       Outsourcing technology transfer, by contracting with an external organization to 
manage selected projects  
  
ACCOUNTING - RECEIPT AND DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
At Texas A&M University, the CTT (a department within the university) receives 
income from the technology transfer agreements with companies. The CTT places the 
income in a "revolving fund account" where the income is first deposited, and then 
distributed or disbursed in accordance with the University's policy - 15% transferred to a 
                                                 
75   This annex was prepared by Terry A. Young, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Technology Transfer and 
Executive Director, Technology Licensing Office, The Texas A&M University System, Mail Stop 
3369, College Station, Texas 77843-3369.  Telephone: 979-847-8682.   
EM address:  t-young@tamu.edu .   90
CTT account for CTT operations; 21.25% to an account in the University President's 
office; 21.25% to an account for the inventor's laboratory or department; and 42.5% to 
the inventor personally. At any point in time, on an accrual accounting basis, the balance 
in the revolving fund account managed by the university CTT should always be "zero."   
As for funding of patents, CTTs in the United States expect the companies receiving the 
innovations for commercial application to pay for the patent application costs, as a "cost 
of doing business" or a "cost of goods sold," similar to labor costs or material costs. In 
the Top 25 Research Universities in the United States, there is much variance in the 
success of the institutions in receiving reimbursement of patent expenses, ranging from 
16% of expenses funded by industry at the California Institute of Technology to 90% of 
expenses funded by industry at the University of Pennsylvania.  
For patents funded "at risk" (without a company to reimburse the costs), there are a 
variety of sources for securing the funds. In a recent survey of the Top 25 Research 
Universities in the United States, 23 of the 25 institutions responded to the survey. One 
of the questions asked was:  "What is the source of funding for patent applications 
prosecuted at risk (without a licensee to reimburse/fund expenses)?" Responses (23): 
          8 -   Patent expenses funded from royalty income accumulated over time in the 
CTT.  
        14-     Patent expenses funded from university accounts; university funds were (i) 
allocated to the TLO in an annual budget for TLO management; OR (ii) controlled by 
the Vice President for Research or other university official; OR (iii) provided by 
departments of faculties (colleges) for inventions arising from the applicable department 
or faculties (college); OR (iv) combinations of the above sources. 
          1 -   Patent expenses funded by an external organization.  
No National Governmental funds are available to CTTs in the United States to pay for 
patent applications.   
START-UP COMPANIES 
There are approximately 200 university CTTs in the United States. Accordingly, there 
are an equal number of ways that universities manage start-up companies. Every 
university has a different set of policies, procedures and attitude towards start-up 
companies.  Some universities are very supportive of start-up companies and participate 
in their formation. Other universities may not participate in start-up companies in any 
manner.  Additionally, other countries manage their start-ups differently. For instance in 
the United Kingdom, there is an organization called UNICO which represents 
"UNIversity COmpanies"....these are external companies formed for the sole purpose of 
creating start-up companies based upon a university's technology. Typically, a UNICO is 
owned - in whole or in part - by the associated university.  For details, see: 
http://www.unico.org.uk/    91
Other potential resources of interest are: 
1. A law of the State of Texas which makes it possible for university faculty members to 
participate in start-up companies: 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/ed/ed0005100.html#ed207.51.912  
2. A law of the State of Texas - entitled "Centers for Technology Development and 
Transfer" - which provides the rules for universities in the State of Texas to participate 
in the establishment of start-up companies: 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/ed/ed0015300.html#top  
3. The Regulation of the The Texas A&M University System which gives the CTT the 
authority to manage the innovations resulting from university research: 
http://sago.tamu.edu/policy/17-02-01.htm  
4. The Protocol of the CTT which explains how the CTT manages intellectual property 
rights and innovations: 
http://tlo.tamu.edu/documents/INFO/tloprotocol.pdf 
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Annex 7  Technology Incubators 
 
Most of the existing incubators in transition countries are little more than custodial care 
centers.  They are primarily controlled work spaces designed initially to help fledgling 
firms survive in the midst of a hostile environment – one in which land is difficult to rent, 
utility connections are difficult to organize, and petty harassment (or worse) from 
bureaucratic inspectors is an unfortunate but common fact of life.  Once a firm enters one 
of these incubators, it is under no pressure to leave.  Many Russian high tech SMEs, for 
example, have remained in these incubators for ten or more years.  These custodial 
incubators may have served a useful purpose during the early phase of the transition 
process. But today, their custodial function is best served by eliminating the 
administrative barriers hampering the emergence of new SMEs and the growth of 
existing SMEs.  This sort of incubator, in other words, should be supplanted by the rule 
of law and clear, transparent and sensible business regulations.
76   
 
At the same time, Latvia should support the development of the type of commercially 
oriented incubators found for example in Israel, Europe and the US.
77  These incubators 
can be defined as “A location in which entrepreneurs can receive pro-active, value-added 
support, and access to critical tools, information, education, contacts, resources and 
capital—that may otherwise be unaffordable, inaccessible or unknown.  A technology 
incubator’s management team facilitates the interaction between each business and these 
resources, and coaches each business through a development process such that the 
resulting venture provides all participants with an acceptable rate of return on their 
investment.”
78   
 
More specifically, a well structured incubator provides (i) links to industry, universities 
and research institutes, (ii) business support services to enhance and develop business, 
(iii) daily hands-on managerial mentoring (general management, finance, accounting, 
marketing, production, R&D), (iv) technological advice and assistance with intellectual 
                                                 
76  Footnote to FIAS report … 
 
77  For a description of the Israeli incubator system, see http://incubators.org.il .  The EU has a very 
progressive and comprehensive incubator development program for 2001-2005.  The legal framework 
for this program and other documentation can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/smie/overviewmenu.cfm . The legal foundation for this program 
can be found in COUNCIL DECISION of 20 December 2000 on a multi-annual programme for 
enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(2001-2005) (2000/819/EC), Official Journal of the European Communities, 29.12.2000.  For a 
discussion of European incubators, see European Commission, Enterprise Directorate General, Final 
Report, Benchmarking Business Incubators, February 2002, Prepared by the Centre for Strategy and 
Evaluation Services.  For a recent analysis of best practices in US incubators, see A National 
Benchmarking Analysis of Technology Business Incubator Performance and Best Practices, US 
Department of Commerce, April, 2003, available at 
http://www.technology.gov/reports/TechPolicy/NBIA/2003Report.pdf  .   
 
78   Technology Innovation Centers: A Guide to Principles and Best Practices, Report prepared for the US 
Department of Commerce by Claggett Wolfe Associates, December 1999, p. 1. 
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property protection, (v) financial resources for R&D and initial marketing expenses, (vi) 
access to potential private investors and strategic partners, and (vii) training and coaching 
so that entrepreneurs have a better understanding of how to deal with potential foreign 
investors and strategic partners.  By the end of the incubation period, the enterprise 




These incubators operate under a rigorous selection process.  Not all firms that apply for 
entry are accepted.  An entrant typically pays for the incubator’s services by giving the 
incubator operator a predetermined share of equity in the new venture.  Finally, 
incubators operate under a rigorous “up or out” procedure.  Firms typically remain in the 
incubator for no more than two years.  At the end of that time period, they are either a 
commercial success, and therefore no longer eligible to remain in the incubator, or a 
commercial failure, in which case they are obliged to leave the incubator in order to make 
room for more promising candidates.   
 
As part of their long term relationship-building processes, these new-style Latvian 
technology incubators could use internships and marketing arrangements to establish 
links with incubators promoting similar technologies in the US, Europe and Asia.  In 
addition, these incubators could be encouraged to establish linkages with leading venture 
capital funds in Asia, Europe or the US that specialize in the development of related 
technologies.  These venture capital funds are typically supporting a portfolio of firms 
that need to solve complex technological problems before they can bring a technology to 
market.  Latvian firms can offer to conduct contract research or other high tech services 
for those firms under the tutelage of US or European venture capitalists.  Over time, these 
lower level commercial research relationships might result in the creation of strategic 
alliances or second generation joint ventures which could be funded by the venture 
capitalists.  The objective, in other words, would be to ensure that Latvian high tech 
enterprises develop the relationships and linkages with demanding customers that the 
enterprise needs if it is to move to progressively higher levels on the global value chain. 
                                                 
79   Adopted from Timo Hokkannen, unpublished IFC manuscript, November 2001. 
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Annex 8  The US Government’s SBIR Program 
Government support for basic research in most countries stops before commercialization 
is feasible.  As noted in a recent OECD report, “The Government’s role in market 
economies should remain simple, namely: aim to diminish the innovation risk for the 
concerned parties.  Governments must use market forces to stimulate innovations. In 
doing so, they reduce the probability of technical and commercial failure in the 
innovation process and increase the rewards for all involved, typically academia and 
industry.  Academics and businessmen have different interests in the process. Academic 
scientists generally have no resources, no stimuli to continue research beyond the point at 
which it is reasonable to expect publication in a scientific journal.  Industry finds this 
point in the research process still fraught with risks, for the knowledge available at this 
moment is still very remote from being able to be assessed in market terms, i.e., to be 
able to calculate any rate of return on the probable investments.  Bridging this gap, the 
so-called ‘innovation barrier,’ should be a primary objective of Government R&D 
spending.”
80   
 
There are a number of ways to accomplish this objective.  For example, the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program sponsored by the US Small Business 
Administration (SBA) is one interesting approach to bridging the innovation barrier.   
SBIR, which was established by the US Congress in 1977 and has been in operation 
continuously since then.
 81  The impetus for the program was the growing realization that 
US industry was losing its global competitive advantage to such “newcomers” as Japan.  
Therefore, US science had to be enlisted in the struggle to regain industrial and 
technological supremacy.  The design strategy was to provide a segment of federal R&D 
funding for advanced, applied research that would focus on small, high tech firms, 
innovation, and increasing the economic return from government-funded R&D.  It is 
important to emphasize that SBIR funds ideas rather than companies.  The objective is to 
determine the commercial feasibility of ideas and to convert research into commercial 
applications. 
 
                                                 
80   Baruch Raz, “National Frameworks for Encouraging Cooperation Between Science and Industry: The 
Case of Israel,” Paper presented at the at the Helsinki Seminar on “Innovation Policy And The 




81  For details of the SBIR program and results of recent evaluations see R.T. Tibbetts, “The Importance of 
Small High-Technology Firms to Economic Growth – and How to Nurture Them,” Proceedings of the 
Conference on Technology Transfer and Innovation, Commonwealth Institute, London, July 2000.  
Also see, David Audretsch, “The Dynamic Role of Small Firms, Evidence from the US,” World Bank 
Institute Working Paper, 2001. Applications and official SBIR program details are available on the US 
Small Business Administration’s web site at www.sba.gov  The SBIR program was renewed by 
Congress in 1996 with no dissenting votes.  Among the firms that received early stage financing from 
SBIR are Apple Computer, Chiron, Intel and Compaq.  A description and summary of several 
evaluations of the SBIR program is available in Wendy Schacht, “Small Business Innovation Research 
Program,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 28, 2000.  
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The US program operates as follows:  
 
•  Ten participating agencies are required by law to allocate 2.5% of their research 
budget to the SBIR program.  In 1977, SBIR allocated $1 million to 42 recipients.  
More recently, SBIR made 3500 grants totaling $1.4 billion.  
•  Grants are awarded at least annually on a peer-review, competitive basis.  There 
are two, publicly funded phases.  Phase I grants provide $100,000 for a six month 
initial investigation into the technical and commercial feasibility of an idea. 
Approximately 1/7 of all applicants receive Phase I support.  Phase II grants 
provide $750,000 of support for an additional two years of commercial feasibility 
studies, production of a prototype, etc.  Approximately 40% of phase I recipients 
qualify for Phase II support.  By the end of Phase II, the concept should be able to 
attract private angel or venture capital.  Seen from this perspective, the SBIR 
program generates deal flow for venture capitalists and candidates for incubators.  
 
The success of the US program is predicated on several critical design features: 
 
•  IPR belongs to the SME that commercializes the idea; not to the Government.  In 
fact, the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, in part, to facilitate the operation of SBIR. 
•  SBIR funds are provided in the form of grants.  The recipient is not expected to 
repay the government irrespective of whether his project is a success or failure.  
The return to the Government comes in the form of the additional taxes generated 
by a globally competitive, rapidly growing high tech SME sector.  [NOTE: 
Recent studies estimate that the extra tax revenues generated by the 30 most 
successful SBIR projects compensated the Government for the entire lifetime cost 
of the SBIR program.] Venture capitalists would be deterred from providing the 
necessary follow on financing if SBIR recipients were expected to repay the 
government with a share of profits or royalties from the sale of products.  In other 
words, the Government should not operate as a senior partner with a senior claim 
on profits or revenues.  
•  SBIR recipients are not required to provide any matching funds.  The objective of 
the program is to finance and explore the commercial feasibility of high risk/high 
return ideas.  A matching fund requirement would destroy this concept support 
only to those ideas that have already demonstrated sufficient commercial 
feasibility to attract private matching funds.  It would not help to uncover those 
high payoff ideas that need additional time and money to demonstrate commercial 
potential. 
 
 The SBIR program generates several major economic development benefits for the US 
economy.  First, it provides high tech entrepreneurs with the start up capital they need to 
explore the commercial feasibility of high risk research ideas.  Venture capitalists 
traditionally have little interest in providing this early stage financing.  Second, it fosters 
the commercialization of government funded R&D.  Third, it establishes productive, 
commercial linkages between high tech SMEs and Government-funded research 
priorities.  And finally, “graduates” of the SBIR program are an excellent source of deal 
flow for venture capitalists. 